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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
VOLUME XI SPRING, 1957 NUMBER 3
APPRAISALS OF LOSS AND DAMAGE
UNDER INSURANCE POLICIES*
WESLEY A. STURGES* AND WILLIAM W. STURGES"
II
7. Irrevocable Appraisal Provisions-Frustration and Displacement-
The Plethora of "Waivers".
Same-Insured's Claim of "Total Loss"-Appraisal Provision.
Same-Insurer's Denial of Liability-Refusal To Pay Anything.
Same-Whether Or Not The Insurer Did Its Part In Arranging For
the Appraisal.
A. Selection of Appriisers-time limitations-procedures.
B. Appointment of umpire-time limitations-procedures.
C. Miscellaneous defaults in furthering early appraisal-"waiver" by
the insurer.
Same-If a First Appraisal Fails, Does the Appraisal Provision Survive-
Are the Parties To Try Again?
A. When the first attempt fails before award.
B. When the first appraisal ends in an award, but is held invalid.
7. Irrevocable Appraisal Provisions-Frustration and Displacement-
The Plethora of "Waivers".
Even though the appraisal provision is adequately drafted to qualify
for irrevocability and even though the insurer has duly demanded appraisal
and has duly pleaded same, the provision is frustrated and displaced in
many different instances. Most of these instances are designated as "waivers."
-Ph.B., LL.B., J.D., LL.D., Professor of Law and Dean Emeritus, Yale Law
School; Visiting Professor of Law, University of Miami Law School; former Chairman of
the Board of Directors, American Arbitration Association.
*Practicing attorney associated with Lassiter, Moore and Van Allen, Charlotte,
North Carolina.
$This article is the second part and a continuation of the original article written
by these authors and appearing in 11 Miami LQ. 1-53 (1956). A third and concluding
part will appear in a subsequent issue.
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These "waivers" are imputed and synthetic affairs derived from one or
more items of conduct attributed to the insurer."" A "waiver" by the in-
surer of the rights to appraisal is the insured's excuse for non-compliance
on his part with the provision. 05
The insured's claim to waiver by the insurer generally is heard and
determined in the insured's action to collect on the policy. The issue of
"waiver" or no "waiver" is heard and determined along with the amount
of the loss and damage. Generally there is no separate or preliminary trial
of the issue of "waiver" of the appraisal provision.' 00 At the conclusion of
the trial, if there is any competent evidence tending to show what the
court will hold is "waiver," the jury will resolve whether or not it was in
fact committed. If it finds "waiver," it also will return a verdict upon the
amount of the loss and damage. And so is the provision first put to trial
by jury as to whether or not it has been waivcd."' 7 It is further frustrated
for, on an hypothesis as it were, that the insured's claim of "waiver" will
prove out to be true, the question as to the amount of loss and damage also
is heard and sent to the jury. If the jury finds that "waiver" was committed,
the appraisal provision is thereby displaced; the jury also returns its verdict
upon the dollar amount of the loss and damage.
In view of the variety of "waivers" ruled against the insurer in the
American cases, the irrevocability of irrevocable appraisal provisions in in-
surance policies has come to be the exception. 08 The insurer generally has
lost on the issue of "waiver" and only rarely does it any longer invoke the
provision against an action brought by the insured to collect on the policy.
It will settle or litigate.
104. Reference already has been made to the judicial practice of favoring the insured
with "interpretations" of the terms and provisions of the policy, especially those,
like the appraisal provision, having post-loss application. Supra 11 ISMArI L.Q. 42 (1956).
In most instances of "waiver" the words and actions are committed after loss and
before the commencement of the insured's action to collect. They are committed by
the adjuster or other representative (such as an appointee as appraiser) brought into
the case by the insurer.
Neither the anti-waiver provisions of the policy nor a separate, post-loss, non-waiver
agreement is controlling with respect to the consequences of the course of conduct
of these representatives. See Bankers Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Draper, 242 Ala. 6001,
7 So.2d 299 (1942); Great American Ins. Co. v. Scott, 89 Colo. 99, 299 Pac. 1051
(1931); Bernhard v. Roclester!German Ins. Co., 79 Conn. 388, 65 Atl. 134 (1906)
(also discussing the kinship of these waivers and estoppels). See also, Oakes v. Pine
Tree State Ins. Co., 112 Me. 52, 90 Atl. 707 (1914).
105. These matters of waiver may be advanced by the insured under general alle-
gations of performance on his part-the matters need not be pleaded specially. Great
American Ins. Co. v. Scott, supra note 104; Simmons v. Home Ins. Co., 235 II1. App.
344 (1925); McCullough v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 113 Mo. 606, 21 S.W. 207 (1893).
106. See, e.g., the course of events at trial as reported in Chainless Cycle Mfg. Co.
v. Security Ins. Co., 169 N.Y. 334, 62 N.E. 392 (1901); compare, Alamo Casualty Co. v.
Trafton, 231 S.W.2d 474 (Tex Civ. App. 1950); Home Ins. Co. v. Turner, ... Miss-,
91 So.2d 722 (1957).
107. See, e.g., Chainless Cycle Mfg. Co. v. Security Ins. Co., supra note 106; Lam-
son Consol. Store Sew. Co. v. Prudential Fire Ins. Co., 171 Mass. 433, 50 N.E.
943 (1898).
108. See, e.g., Foster's Study of the Missouri cases in his article, Arbitration and
Appraisals In the Missouri Courts, 1954 WAsn. U.L.Q. 49, 60, 62 (1954).
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The making of the "waiver" in these cases has been an implementation
of the judicial crusade to prevent the insurance contract from being made
(by the insurer) "a trap for the unwary" (i. e., the insured).
The predominant thought in this connection appears to be that the
"entrapment" of the insured is best prevented by displacing the appraisal
provision. Alternatives have been considered only rarely. Quite clearly
in various cases the alleged "entrapment" might as readily have been ob-
viated otherwise. 10 This crusade antedates the standard policy and ap-
praisal provision. It has continued unabated with respect to the provision
in the standard contract as written by the legislature.
The judicial climate for the appraisal provision in these cases is quite
at odds with that in the cases in which the courts first extricated the ap-
praisal provision from the common law restriction against contracts which
might oust the courts of their jurisdiction and ruled that the provision,
when properly drafted, is irrevocable by action.
Waivers as ruled with respect to these appraisal provisions in insurance
policies have very few companions in cases making "waiver" of provisions
for appraisal in other commercial contracts or of provisions for valuations
and price fixing as used in various commercial contracts, or of architect
and engineer clauses in construction contracts, which have been held irrev-
ocable by action. Arbitration provisions in commercial contracts and col-
lective bargaining agreements which qualify under modern arbitration
statutes making them irrevocable and enforceable also have escaped the
judicial pursuit of "waiver" and the collateral litigation by which the ir-
revocable appraisal provision in insurance policies has been frustrated and
generally displaced. 110
While the cases developing the various grounds to defeat the plea of
the appraisal provision and the litigation involved in determining their
existence have rendered the provision in insurance contracts quite useless,
it does not follow that it should be relegated to such futility. The decisions
ruling on these issues and finding "waiver" or other grounds to defeat the
provision cannot be said to confirm the superiority of litigation over ap.
praisal to determine the amount of loss and damage when the parties dis-
agree about it. One may conclude that appraisal probably would have been,
in most cases, more expeditions and less expensive than litigating the matter.
There have been expressions of judicial judgment to this effect. The
Court of Appeals of Kentucky once commented upon the matter as follows:
109. Consult and compare, for example, Tilley v. Connecticut Fire Ins. Co., 860
Va. 811, 11 S.E. 120 (1890) re reasons for the waiver charged against the insurer for
waiting too long in claiming arbitration and the views on the same point in Bratley v.
Brotherhood of American Yeoman, 159 Minn. 14, 198 N.W. 128 (1924).
110. Consult In re Pahlberg Petition 131 Fed. 968 (2d Cir. 1942); Kulukundis
Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978 (2d Cir. 1942); In re 1,tility Oil
Corp., 69 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1934); Matter of Lipman (Housei Shellac Co.)," 289 N.Y.
76, 43 N.E.2d 817 (1943).
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The arbitration clause in insurance policies issued upon personal
property, if lived up to in the spirit that justifies their encourage-
ment by law, is a serviceable method of settling the question of loss
or damage. While the facts are yet fresh, and the damaged articles
are to be seen, it is reasonable to suppose that impartial men, fa-
miliar with the character and value of such goods in that com-
munity, can, by personal inspection, and by the use of their judg-
ments and experience, more nearly come to a true valuation than
any number of men not on the scene, inexperienced in every prob-
ability in the business of valuing such articles, trying to get at the
values upon the testimony often of biased or incompetent or care-
less witnesses."' (Italics supplied.)
At all events, it seems that if insurance companies are to be allowed,
or required (as is true under standard policy legislation), to include the
provision in their policies, it should be capable of more useful function
than it now serves.
As previously indicated, in the course of the litigation in the cases
involving "waiver," the courts frequently have emphasized that the appraisal
provision is a one-sided affair designed for the benefit of the insurer. It is
a one-sided affair in the sense that in most jurisdictions only tie insurer
can enforce it in any respect. The insurer can enforce it (absent "waiver")
in the particular of staying or abating the insured's law suit pending the
appraisal.
The insured has no remedy of enforcement; in most jurisdictions the
insurer has no other remedy of enforcement. The insurer is free to invoke
the provision (absent "waiver") or to forego it and stand trial on the
amount of the loss and damage. Such was the situation after the provision
was first ruled irrevocable and when the provision was written into the
standard policy by the legislature. This still is the situation with respect
to the provision under most standard policy legislation.
If more effective remedies of enforcement were to be accorded the
parties, the courts might well abate their crusade to displace the provision
and, instead, facilitate its enforcement. Remedies, for both parties alike,
might well be organized along the lines of those provided in the more mod-
em arbitration statutes making arbitration provisions which qualify there-
under irrevocable and enforceable. Remedial legislation will be necessary
for it is doubtful indeed that the courts will grant such remedies unaided
by statute. In this connection it may be noticed that the New York arbi-
tration statute originally enacted in 1920 was subsequently amended to cover
111. Continental Ins. Co. v. Vallandingham, 116 Ky. 287, 76 S.W. 22 (1903).
Illustrative of the court's comments upon the ineptness of trial by jury to determine the
amount of loss and damage, or the speculations in verdicts or trial court findings, or
the bias, incompetence or carelessness of witnesses or some combination thereof, see
Abramowitz v. Continental Ins. Co., 170 Minn. 215, 212 N.W. 449 (1927); Schwartz.
man v. Fire Ins. Co., 318 Mo. 1089, 2 S.W.2d 593 (1927); Gilders v. Underwriters,
91 Go. App. 231, 85 S.E.2d 499 (1954).
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these appraisal provisions. Experience with this legislation and with other
legislation whereby other enforcement remedies have been afforded in con-
nection with these provisions, is reviewed in a later section.1 -'
rfhe following review of the cases dealing with "waiver" or other grounds
to defeat the provision now under consideration probably would not be
merited if it were only to verify the near uselessness of the appraisal pro-
vision in insurance policies as it has been wrought in the courts. It is
deemed worthy, however, to scrutinize at least a variety of these grounds
to indicate not only the expediency of remedial legislation to the end of
making the provision more useful to both parties but also to indicate the
existing backlog of "waivers" which any such legislation might inherit unless
it were adequately disowned.
Same-Insured's Claim of "Total Loss."
Whenever the insured claims "total loss" the appraisal provision be.
comes frustrated or displaced by litigation upon the merits of that claim.
Unless the insurer admits "total loss" the issue will go to trial, generally
before the jury, upon proper instructions by the court as to the legal con-
stituency of "total loss".'" 1rlie trial and determination of this claim will
be had in the insured's action to collect on the policy. In the course of
such litigation the efficacy of the appraisal provision has been tested and
resolved in two general classes of eases-namely, those in which no valued-
policy statute or stipulation was involved, and those in which such statute or
stipulation was involved.
Given a "total loss" general questions upon the applicability of the
appraisal provision have been posed from time to time as follows: What
use can appraisal serve if there is total loss? What difference can there be
over the amount of the loss if there is "total loss"?"
4
112. Also the British experience-in the meantime, reference should be made to
In the Matter of Selmar Box Co., 309 N.Y. 60, 127 N.E.2d 808 (1955).
113. See, e.g., Oppenheimer v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 119 Minn. 417, 138 N.W.
777 (1912).
114. These questions are discussed in Stout v. Phoenix Assur. Co., 65 N.J. Eq. 566,
56 Atl. 691 (1904); Tilley v. Connecticut Fire Ins. Co., 86 Va. 811, 11 S.E. 120
(1890). Consult also Reilley v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 311 Ill. App. 562 (1941).
When the appraisal provision covered "damage to property not totally destroyed",
as did some early appraisal provisions, it appears to have been easy to conclude that
"total loss" was not covered. Williams v. Hartford Ins. Co., 54 Cal. 442 (1880).
Two early New York cases also concluded that a provision covering the "amount
of sound value and of damage" did not cover "total loss." Said the court in Rosenwald
v. Phenix Ins. Co., 50 Hum. 172 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Cen. T. 1888):
It is quite clear that this provision can have no possible relation to a thing
which has no existence; absolute destruction having distinguished the loss. If
there had been any design to require arbitration where a total loss occurs, it is
fair to presume that with the vigilance which marks the contracts made by the
insurance companies it would have been set out in the policy.
See also, Long v. Eagle Fire Co., 12 App. Div. 39, 42 N.Y.Supp. 539 (4th Dep't
1896). Compare Littrell v. Allemania Fire Ins. Co., 222 App. Div. 302, 226 N.Y.Supp.
243 (3rd Dep't 1928).
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Decisions involving the more modern appraisal provisions are nearly
in accord that they are applicable to "total loss" as well as partial. In these
cases no valued-policy stipulation or statute was involved.
In the New York case of Littrell v. Allemannia Fire Ins. Co.", the
court put the matter as follows:
The policy in the present case was issued October 19, 1925, pursu-
ant to Section 121 of the Insurance Law (added by Laws 1917, c.
440, and amended by Laws 1922, c. 268, and Laws 1923, c. 438) pro-
viding for a standard form of policy.
That statute specifically makes the appraisal provisions in the stand-
ard policy apply to 'lost or damaged property,' and requires the ap-
praisers or appraiser and umpire to ascertain the 'amount of said
loss or damage' in respect to the property. We think the words
'loss' and 'damage' were designedly used to indicate a distinction
in respect to property entirely or partially destroyed. The policy
in this case carries out the intent of the statute and makes the same
distinction between 'loss' and 'damage.' The word 'loss' implies
that the property is no longer in existence, whereas the word 'dam-
age' implies that it still exists although in damaged form ....
No good reason exists why there should be a distinction in respect
to property totally or partially destroyed. The appraisers can
make the appropriate estimates in one case as well as in the other,
and we think such is the intent of the statute and the policy issued
pursuant thereto.'"
Under valued-policy statutes the appraisal provision has been held
inapplicable to "total loss". In the event of "total loss" the insurer is bound
like a debtor to pay the value stated in the policy; that figure is, by the statute,
the amount to be paid whether the dollar amount of the loss is more or
less. Accordingly, appraisal can serve no useful purpose.
115. 222 App. Div. 302, 226 N.Y.Supp. 243 (3rd I)ep't 1928). The court looked
askance at the two earlier New York cases cited above, supra note 114.
116. Accord:
U.S. Williamson v. Liverpool Ins. Co., 122 Fed. 59 (8 Cir. 1903) (award of
amount as for total loss authorized under appraisal provision).
Iowa. Adams v. New York Bowery Ins. Co., 5 Iowa 6, 51 N.W. 1149 (1892)
(submission and award under the provision must cover "all loss or damage to the prop-
erty insured, whether total or partial").
La. Hart v. Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 136 La. 114, 66 So. 558 (1914).
Mich. Chippewa Lumber Co. v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 80 Mich. 116, 44 N.W. 1055
(1890).
Minn. Gasser v. Sun Fire Office, 42 Minn. 315, 44 N.W. 252 (1890); but see,
Oppenheimer v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 119 Minn. 417, 138 N.W. 777 (1912).
Miss. See Scottish Union & National Ins. Co. v. Skaggs, 114 Miss. 618, 75 So. 437(1917 .. Stout v. Phoenix Assur. Co., 65 Nj. Eq. 566, 56 Att. 691 (1904) (award of
an amount for total loss authorized under appraisal provision).
Said the Court:
The form of the clause seems to be broad enough to include an appraisement
for all loss, for its language is that, in the event of disagreement as to the amount
of loss (clearly all the loss), the same shall he ascertained by two competent
and disinterested appraisers.
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Nor can the appraisal provision be invoked pending determination of
the issue whether the loss was "total" or only "partial" to defeat the trial
of that issue.
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky stated the prevailing view on this
matter:
Counsel [for the insurer] insists that until the extent of the dam-
age or loss was ascertained it could not be known whether the loss
was total, or partial only; that if it was but partial, then the arbitra-
tion feature of the contract clearly, and under all the authorities,
applied. That the parties might have submitted the question of
the extent of damage or loss to arbitrators in the case, we do not
doubt. Their award, though, in our opinion, could have been used
as a basis of the settlement only in event the loss was partial. If it
was total, no matter what may have been the value of the building
(in the absence of fraud mentioned in the statute), the liability of
the insurer was fixed at the sum named in the face of the policy;
and the agreement to submit that question to arbitration, being
without consideration, and being contrary to the policy of the law
as embodied in Section 700, Ky. St. [the valued-policy statute]
was not binding on the insured. The only one who took any risk
by refusing the arbitration was the insured, for if the loss turned out
to be only partial, then, without a fulfillment of the condition
prccedt t (and it not being waived) appellee could have recov-
ered nothing. Appellee [the insured) took the burden and the
risk of maintaining that the loss was total."17
The insured can maintain his action as for total loss although
the parties already have actually engaged in an appraisal under the ap-
praisal provision and although an award has been returned as for a partial
loss and for a sum less than the amount stated in the policy. No such
117. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Bourbon County Court, 115 Ky. 109, 72 S.W. 739
(1903); see also Royal Ins. Co. v. Ward, 252 Ky. 687, 68 S.W.2d 9 (1934).
Accord:
La. Hart v. North British and Mercantile Ins. Co., 182 La. 551, 162 So. 177 (1935).
Minn. Cohage v. Union Ins. Co., 82 Minn. 426, 85 N.W. 212 (1901); see also,
Oppenheimer v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 119 Minn. 417, 138 N.W. 777 (1912).
Mo. Stevens v. Norwich Union Fire Ins. Co., 120 Mo. App. 88, 96 S.W. 684
(1906); O'Keefe v. Liverpool Ins. Co., 140 Mo. 558, 41 S.W. 922 (1897); Jacobs v.
North British and Mercantile Ins. Co., 61 Mo. App. 572 (1895).
Ohio. Queens Ins. Co. v. Leslie, 47 Ohio St. 409, 24 N.E. 1072 (1890).
Oki. Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Homewood, 32 Okla. 521, 122 Pac.
196 (1912).
Texas. Republic Ins. Co, v.. Hale, 69 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934); Export
Ins. Co. v. Axe, 36 S.W.2d 572 (Tex Civ. App. 1931); Aff'd Export Ins. Co. v. Axe,
58 S. W.2d 39 (Comm. of App. 1933); American Cent. Ins. Co. v. Terry, 15 S.W.2d
81 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929); A[f'd 26 SAV.2d 162 (Comm. of App. 1930); National
Fire Ins. Co. v. louse 298 S.V. 658 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917).
W. Va. Nicholas v. Granite State Fire Ins. Co., 125 W.Va. 349, 24 S.E.2d 280
(1942).
And certainly the courts on appeal will not review the evidence with disfavor for
the plaintiff's case. "Because the verdict of the jury [of total loss] was in plaintiff's
favor, it is proper that the evidence be reviewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff's
theory of the case." Nicholas v. Granite State Fire Ins. Co., supra. See further,
United State Fire Ins. Co. v. Boswell, 82 S.W.2d 176 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935); Eck v.
Netherlands Ins.- Co., 203 Wis. 515, 234 N.W. 718 (1931).
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course of conduct constitutes a waiver of the rights of the insured to collect
according to the valued-policy statute.
Said the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in such a case:" t8
The parties submitted the question of the amount of loss on the
buildings to arbitrators, pursuant to a stipulation contained in the
policy, and the arbitrators awarded the same at a sum which would
iake the liability of the company $682 less than it would be if the
policy is enforced under the statute. It is claimed that the sub-
mission is a waiver of the benefits of the statute, and that the de-
fendant's liability is limited by the award. This proposition was
negatived by this court in Thompson v. Insurance Co. [45 Wis.
389j"19
If the insured shall have guessed wrong, it being finally adjudged on
the evidence that the loss was only partial, then appraisal there must be as
indicated in the above opinion of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky-
unless, of course, the insurer shall have "waived" its rights to it.' 20  If there
shall have been an earlier appraisal and award, the award will fix the amount
of the insured's recovery in such case, there being no cause otherwise to
set it aside.'
2 '
Same-Insurer's "Denial of Liability"-Refusal to Pay Anything.
There is near consensus among the decisions that when the insurer
denies liability on the policy it thereby "waives" its rights under the ap-
praisal provision. 122
In some of the reported cases it is not clear when the denial took place;
in a few it is clear that it was first made in the insurer's answer to the in-
sured's action to collect on the policy; in the others it is apparent, or readily
inferred, that it was made after loss and before commencement of the in-
118. Seyk v. Millers' Nat. Ins. Co., 74 Wis. 67, 41 N.W 443 (1889). Accord,
Eck v. Netherlands Ins. Co., 203 Wis. 515, 234 N.W. 718 (1931).
119. Accord:
Del. Mondzelewski v. Fidelity and Guaranty Ins. Corp., 48 Del. 441, 105 A.2d787 k1954).7 y8 Merchant's Ins. Co. v. Stephens, 59 S.W. 511 (Ky. 1900); and see Hartford
Fire Ins. Co. v. Bourbon County Court, 115 Ky. 109, 72 S.W. 739 (1903).
Miss. Yorkshire Ins. Co. v. Brewer, 175 Miss. 538, 166 So. 361 (1936); See Frank-
lin Fire Ins. Co. v. Brewer, 173 Miss. 317, 159 So. 545 (1935).
Mo. Baker v. Phoenix Assur. Co., 57 Mo. App. 559 (1894); Prather v. Connecti-
cut Fire Ins. Co., 188 Mo. App. 653, 176 S.W. 527 (1915). Compare Harmon v.
Stuyvesant Ins. Co., 170 Mo. App. 309, 156 S.W. 87 (1913).
Neb. German Ins. Co. v. Eddy, 36 Neb. 461, 54 S.W. 856 (1893).
N.Y. See Lee v. Hamilton Fire Ins. Co., 130 Misc. 165, 223 N.Y.Supp. 441 (Sup.
Ct. 1927) (valued policy by the terns of policy; not by statute.); aff'd., by 4 to 3
decision, 251 N.Y. 230, 167 N.E. 426 (1929); Note 14 MiNN. L. RLv. 301 (1929-30).
Texas. United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Boswell, 82 S.W. 2d 176 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935).
V. Va. Hinkle v. North River Ins. Co., 70 W. Va. 681, 75 S.E. 54 (1912).
120. Goldstein v. National Fire Ins. Co., 106 Wash. 346, 180 Pac. 409 (1919).
121. Mondzelowiski v. Fidelity and Guaranty Ins. Corp., 48 Del. 441, 105 A.2d
787 (1954); Yorkshire Ins. Co. v. Brewer, 175 Miss. 538, 166 So. 361 (1936); Gouin
v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 145 Wash. 199, 259 Pac. 387 (1927).
122. The cases are collected and summarized in an Annotation, 3 A.L.R. 2d 407-416.
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sured's action. In some cases it has appeared both before the action and
in the insurer's answer.
12'
While the term "denial of liability" is most frequently used in these
cases, the "waiver" is likewise applied to the insurer's refusal to pay. Waiver
drawn from the insurer's "denial of liability" is as readily derived from any
other set of words or action by the insurer indicating to the insured its
refusal to pay anything on the policy.' 2' It is not of any substantial sig-
nificance in fixing the waiver in either case that the insurer did not give any
reason for its denial or refusal.'-
And so, when the adjuster or other representative covering the case
for the insurer reports to the insured: "You will not get a cent,"'' 26 or
"You burned the property and we will not pay you until we pay you at
the end of the Supreme Court," 12 7 or "No, I ain't going to pay you any
money till you go into court and fight us-go ahead and sue,"' 2 or "You
go to a lawyer and give him the case to sue because the company refused
absolutely to pay,"' 29 or "The company would not pay and if you want
123. Rarely has the matter been resolved on the pleadings. It has happened,
however. See Bailey v. Aetna Ins. Co., 77 Wis. 336, 46 N.W. 440 (1890) (adjudica-
tion made on insurer's demurrer to insured's complaint to collect on policy; demurrer
deni4. It seems clear that when there is uncertainty as to what was meant by insur-
er's words or actions, the insured's interpretation will count most in determining whether
or not the insurer denied liability. Apparently the insured is a competent witness on
the point; and generally the jury will make the final decision on the basis of the in-
sured's understanding. See In re Insurance Co. v. Baker, 84 Colo. 53, 268 Pac. 585
1928); Rott v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 218 Mich. 576, 188 N.W. 334 (1922);
eigle & Son v. Badger Lumber Co., 106 Mo. App. 110, 80 S.W. 4 (1904); Lamson
Consol. Store Serv. Co. v. Prudential Fire Ins. Co., 171 Mass. 433, 50 N.E. 943 (1898).
Consult, City of Fall River v. Aetna Ins. Co., 219 Mass. 454, 107 N.E. 367 (1914).
When there is conflicting testimony as to what the insurer's representative reported
to the insured but the insured's version makes for denial of liability or refusal to pay,
the jury is likely to accept his version. It is certain that such a verdict will be sus-
tained. This is true even when the insurer's representative testifies in rebuttal of the
insured's version of what he (the representative) said and did. See Springfield Fire &
Marine Ins. Co. v. Shapoff, 179 Ky. 804, 201 S.W. 116 (1918); Rott v. Westchester
Fire Ins. Co., supra; Hamberg v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 68 Minn. 335, 71
N.W. 388 (1897); Rimmer v. Aachen & Munich Fire Ins. Co., 82 Atl. 1060 (R.I. 1912).
125. When preliminary investigations and discussions over the loss are shown to
have come to a stop, evidence indicating that the insurer gave the insured the "silent
treatment" re settlement of his claim is competent and sufficient evidence of waiver;
a verdict of waiver is certain to be sustained. Lamson Consol. Store Serv. Co. v. Pru-
dential Fire Ins. Co., supra note 124; Ball v. Royal Ins. Co., 129 Mo. App. 34, 107 S.W.
1097 (1908). See also Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Stokes, 149 Ill. 319, 36 N.E. 408 (1893)
insurer's advices to the insured about settlement being couched in equivocal expressions
(as to the "integrity of the loss") plus procrastination in closing the ase, constituted
waiver for want of "bona fide" disclosure by insurer of its grounds of defense against
the policy). ,
126. Bernhard v. Rochester German Ins. Co., 79 Conn. 388, 65 Atl. 134 (1906);
Seigle v. Badger Lumber Co., 106 Mo. App. 110, 80 S.W. 4 (1904); Johnstone v.
Home Ins. Co., 34 S.W.2d 1029 (1931); Lang v. Eagle Fire Co., 12 App. Div. 39,
42 N.Y.Supp. 539 (4th Dep't 1896); Connecticut Fire Ins. Co. v. Hilbrant, 73 S.W.
558 (Tex. Civ. App. 1903).
127. Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. Hite, 83 111. App. 549 (1899).
128. Hamberg v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 68 Minn. 335, 71 N.W. 388
(1897).
129. Cheshansky v. Merchants' Fire Ins. Co., 102 N.J L. 414, 131 Atl. 910 (1926).
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the money you will have to sue for it,""' or "'lie company would not
do a damn thing,"' 31 or reports of like tenor;4 2 the insurer is as deep
into "waiver" of its rights under the appraisal provision as if the representa-
tive had reported its "denial of liability" with or without adding explanation
of why.
In some of the cases involving the make-up for this waiver the post-loss
negotiations and communications between the parties have lent themselves
to alternative versions as follows: Was the insurer's denial of liability or
refusal to pay an unqualified refusal to pay anything, or was it, instead,
limited to being a refusal to pay the amount which the insured claimed
but in a tenor of willingness to work out with the insurcd the fair amount
of the loss? Action of the latter version is permissible under the appraisal
provision. Any substantial evidence on behalf of the insured, however,
indicates the first version is sufficient to take the issue of "waivcr" to the
jury. 13 3 Any substantial evidence on behalf of the insured that the parties'
failure to agree on the amount, accrued with, or through, an offer by the
insurer of a certain sum on a take-it-or-go-without basis, or on a take-it-
or-go-and-sue basis is sure to spell the "waiver" now under consideration.' 4
The identification and evaluation of the insurer's denial of liability or
refusal to pay as being "waiver" also become involved when the insurer
assigns a reason for its refusal. It may refuse to pay anything or it may
offer to pay only a limited amount for one or more declared reasons.
Thus, in an Alabama case the insurer refused to pay any amount because,
130. Hlarwood v. United State Fire Ins. Co., 136 Me. 233, 7 A.2d 899 (1939);
Evans v. Farmers' Reliance Co., 110 N.J.L. 159, 164 At]. 258 (1933).
131. Callahan v. London Ins. Co., 98 Misc. 589, 163 N.Y.Supp. 322 (1st Dep't
19171 32 See Harwood v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 136 Me. 223, 7 A. 2d 899 (1930;
Jewett v. Quincy Mnt. Fire Ins. Co., 125 Me. 234, 132 AtI. 523 (1926); Maki v.
Commonwealth Ins. Co., 232 Mich. 295, 205 N.W. 83 (1925); Concordia Fire Ins.
Co. v. Barkett, 110 Okla. 177, 236 Pac. 890 (1925); Connecticut Fire Ins. Co. v. Hil-
brant, 73 S.W. 558 (Tex. Civ. App. 1903).
133. Lamson Consol. Store Sem. Co. v. Prudential Fire Ins. Co., 171 Mass. 433,
50 N.E. 943 (1898); Rott v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 218 Mich. 576, 188 N.W. 334
(1922). Compare Pollina v. State Mot. Rodded Fire Ins. Co., 249 Mich. 121, 227
N.W. 765 (1929); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Conner, 223 Miss. 799, 79 So.2d 236
(1955). See also Rimmer v. Aachen & Munich Fire Ins. Co., 82 At]. 1060 (R.I. 1912).
134. Rott v. WVestcbester Fire Ins. Co. 218 Mich. 576, 188 N.W. 334 (1922);
Maki v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 232 Mich. 295, 205 N.W. 83 (1925); Cullen v.
Insurance Co., 126 Mo. App. 412, 104 S.W. 117 (1907); Concordia Fire ins. C
Barkett, 110 Okla. 177, 236 Pac. 890. See also Shook v. Retail Hardware Mut. Fire
Ins. Co., 154 Mo. App. 394, 134 S.W. 589 (1911). See further, Dautel v. Pennsyl-
vania Ins. Co., 65 Mo. App. 44 (offer of settlement once made was later withdrawn).
That the posing of these alternative versions invites refinements in distinguishing
between a take-it-or-go-without offer working the waiver and "an attempt in good faith
to agree with the plaintiff" on the amount of loss with no "arbitrary refusal to try to
agree", see James v. Insurance Co., 135 Mo. App. 247, 115 S.W. 478 (1909).
Compare with the foregoing cases the following in which the denial or refusal to
pay above a certain amount was deemed ineffective as waiver; Chambers v. Home
Insurance Co., 241 Ala. 20, I So.2d 15 (1941); Pollina v. State Mint. Rodded Fire Ins.
Co., 249 Mich. 121, 227 N.W. 765 (1929); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Conner, 79
So.2d 236 (Miss. 1955).
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according to its claim, nothing was due the insured after paying his
mortgagee. The court ruled that this was not a waiver. Said the Court:
"Such denial [as constitutes waiver] must in general be upon the
basis of the invalidity of the contract, its want of coverage, or forfeiture
on account of a breach of some stipulation or warranty in the policy."'35
On the other hand, the Maine and Missouri courts ruled that when
the insurer denied all liability or refused to pay anything on the ground,
as it claimed, that the loss occurred from a cause not covered by the
policy, there was an "unqualified denial" and waiver.' 6 Thus, in the
Missouri case, the insurer claimed that cattle covered against lightning were
not killed by lightning. Said the Missouri Court of Appeals:
If this "was not a denial of all liability under its contract, it would
be hard to conceive what would amount to such a denial, unless we
accept defendant's idea that it must be a denial of the validity of the
contract itself. But no such meaning was ever attached to the language
before, according to our understanding, and we do not think it can be
found in the books-reductio ad absurdem.".la
The latter view also has prevailed in cases wherein the insurer denied
liability to pay for part of the property for which the insured had made
claim on the ground that the policy did not cover that property' 3 7
Several different explanations have been advanced by the courts in
support of the "waivers" now under consideration. Some have been more
popular than others; some have been contradicted. These explanations
may be sorted into classes about as follows: (1) Those which declare that
the denial or refusal renders the appraisal futile; (2) those which indicate
that there is fatal inconsistency between the demand for appraisal and
the denial of liability; and (3) those which indicate that the insurer, by
denying liability thereby repudiates its obligation to make "bona fide"
effort to agree with the insured and settle the amount of loss.
There also is the view, not dependent upon "waiver", that the
appraisal provision does not cover issues raised by the denial of liability;
135. Chambers v. Home Ins, Co., 241 Ala. 20, 1 So.2d 15 (1941). But see,
contra, Moore v. Sun. Ins. Office, 100 Minn. 374, 111 N.W. 260 (1907). Compare
Bankers Fire & Marine ins. Co. v. Draper, 242 Ala. 601, 7 So.2d 299 (1942).
136. Jewett v. Quincy Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 125 Me. 234, 132 At. 523 (1926);
White v. Farmers' Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 97 Mo. App. 590, 71 S.W. 707 (1903). Con-
sult also, Insurance Co. v. Baker, 84 Colo. 53, 268 Pac. 585 (1928) (insurer
claimed insured had no loss in any amount); Mechanics Ins. Co. v. lodge, 149
Ill. 298, 37 N.E. 51 (1894); ltarowitz v. Concordia Fire Ins. Co., 129 Tenn. 691, 168
S.W. 163 (1914) (claim that the damage resulted from water and not covered by fire
policy).
136a. White v. Farmers' Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 97 Mo. App. 590, 597-8, 71 S.W.
707, 709 (1903).
137. Ovavez v. Patrons' Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 233 Mich. 305, 206 N.W. 503 (1925).
Compare Pollina State Mut. Rodded Fire Ins. Co., 249 Mich. 121, 227 N.W. 765
(1929). To like effect, Westfield Cigar Co. v. Insurance Co., 169 Mass, 382, 47 N.E.
1026 (1897). See also, Itasca Paper Co. v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 175 Minn. 73, 220
N.W. 425 (1928).
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that it can be pleaded only against the trial of issues as to the amount of
loss or damage.
(1) The futility. The futility of appraisal in these cases is voiced
as follows: Upon the insurer's denial or refusal "there is nothing left to
arbitrate"; that appraisal in such cases would be "an idle and useless
ceremony"; and, in similar vein, "no difference of opinion touching the
amount of loss could arise where all liability was denied." 138s Explanations
of this tenor appear to be the most prevalent. They do not seem persuasive.
This is true because, in the first place, the issues raised by the insurer's
defenses against the policy generally are distinct and separate from any
issue as to the amount of loss and damage or its detemination pursuant
to the terms of the policy.'l 9 Generally these issues look only to a de-
claratory adjudication of liability or nonliability regardless of any amount.
In the second place, only if the insurer wins on its defense against the
policy does consideration of the amount of the loss and damage pass
from the parties' concern. If the insurer loses (and the recorded cases
indicate that this is likely) the amount of loss and damage will come up
for determination either by the jury in the same action, or by appraisal. 4"
In these instances appraisal may not be relegated to the role of an idle or
useless ceremony. Accordingly, at best, this explanation must rest upon
the hypothesis that the insurer will win on its defense against the policy.
But the explanation has not been restricted to the instances in which
the insurer wins. If it were, it would be a rather vain thing to talk about-
and even more so to advance as support for the waiver as ruled in the
cases now under consideration.
(2) The inconsistency. Some of the opinions indicate that denial of
liability and plea of the appraisal provision are, in some general way,
138. Cal. Famum v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 83 Cal. 246, 23 Pac. 769 (1890).
Colo. Insurance Co. v. Baker, 84 Colo. 53, 268 Pac. 585 (1928).
111. Retail Merchants Ass'n Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Cox, 138 111. App. 14 (1907).
La. Baillie v. Western Assur. Co., 49 La. Ann. 658, 21 So. 736 (1897).
Maine. Harwood v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 136 Me. 223, 7 A.2d 899 (1939);
Oakes v. Pine Tree State Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 112 Me. 52, 90 Alt. 707 (1914) ("the law
will not require the useless and expensive formality of an arbitration when the insurer,
for whose benefit it was provided, has rendered it superfluous").
Minn. Page v. Rolling Stone Fire Ins. Co., 166 Minn. 74, 207 NW. 24 (1926);
Cash v. Concordia Fire Ins. Co., Ill Minn. 162, 126 N.W. 524 (1910).
Miss. Mississippi Fire Ins. Co. v. Dixon, 133 Miss. 570, 98 So. 101 (1923), but
compare, Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Conner, 223 Miss. 799, 79 So.2d 236 (1955).
Tenn. Hickerson v. German-American Ins. Co., 96 Tenn. 193, 33 S.W. 1041
(1896).
139. Even if the insurer were to deny liability on the single ground of no loss-
this is suggested by Wainer v. Milford Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 153 Mass. 335, 26 N.E.
877 (1891), or on the grounds of no loss beyond a given sum, the determination of
such issue would not necessarily resolve what is the total amount of the loss and dam-
age figured according to the terms of the policy.
140. It is clear that the insured is not precluded by its "waiver" (its denial of lia-
bility or refusal to pay anything) from putting in issue the amount of loss and damage.
Maimes v. Automobile Ins. Co., 112 Misc. 656, 183 N.Y.Supp. 690 (Sup. Ct. 1920);
Gratz v. Insurance Co., 282 Pa. 224, 127 Atl. 620 (1925).
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exclusive and inconsistent. In some cases the inconsistency appears to
be derived from an assumption made at the time of ruling out the plea
that the insurer's defense against the policy is good.' 41 It is difficult to
make inconsistency out of this situation.
The inconsistency also has been based upon the view that "the insurer
must admit liability to pay something before it can insist upon the
insured's going through with what would be otherwise an idle and useless
ceremony.' 4 2 It is doubled that there is any American decision ruling the
precise point that the insurer must make such positive admission in order
to qualify its demand for arbitration or its plea of the provision; and
there is at least one case holding that such admission is not so required.""3
Allied with this general thesis are the observations that the insurer's demand
for appraisal is a waiver of its defenses against the policy; that such demand
is "a concession of its liability for some amount." The Supreme Court of
Tennessee put the matter as follows:
"In many courts it has been held that such demand for appraisal is a
waiver of other defenses upon the part of the insurer, notwithstanding the
policy may provide that the award shall be binding only as to the amount
of loss, and shall not decide the liability of the company under the policy.
Upon reason it would seem that this result should follow, as it would only
be a farce to adjust the amount of loss, when the company denied liability
for any amount. In such case the company has nothing to arbitrate and
the amount of damages is a matter to be determined only after the pre-
liminary questions of liability have been conceded or adjudged." (Italics
supplied).
Taking this statement at its face value, it seems clear that there well
may be something to arbitrate, namely, the amount of the loss and damage-
"after the preliminary questions of liability have been conceded or adjudged."
(Italics supplied to question what the Court could mean by these words
in light of the first part of the opinion that the demand for appraisal is a
waiver of other defenses).' 44
This general idea of inconsistency between the demand and the denial
also has been voiced in the vernacular of pleading problems. May the
141. See, e.g., the opinion in Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. Hite, 83 Ill. App. 549 (1899).
142. Lang v. Eagle Fire Co., 12 App. Div. 39, 42 N.Y.Supp. 539 (4th Dep't 1896).
This idea that the insurer must admit liability for some amount before it can in-
voke the appraisal provision is voiced in comparatively few other opinions. See Mentz
v. Armenia Fire Ins. Co., 79 Pa. 478 (1875); Hickerson v. German-American Ins. Co.,
96 Tenn. 193, 33 S.W. 1041 (1896); Kahn v. Traders Ins. Co., 4 Wyo. 419, 34 Pac.
1059 (1893).
143. Western Assur. Co. v. Hall Bros., 120 Ala. 547, 24 So. 936 (18981. See
also Bryson v. American Eagle Fire Co., 132 Me. 172, 168 Atl. 715 (1933). Perhaps
New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Blackshear, Inc., 116 Fla. 289, 156 So. 695 (1934) should
be understood as ruling the precise point that the positive admission must be made-
there is quite clear language to that effect in the majority opinion.
144. Hiekerson v. German-American Ins. Co., 96 Tenn. 193, 33 S.W. 1041 (1896).
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pleading of the two matters by the insurer involve fatally inconsistent
defenses? The Suprcme Court of Montana once advanced an answer in
the affirmative saying that "insisting that arbitration should have been had
to ascertain the amount of loss carries with it the implication that a
contract of insurance existed; that defendant was liable in some amount;
that merely an erroneous valuation of the property destroyed was made by
the plaintiff; and that defendant would have cooperated in seeking an
agreement as to the amount of loss, and concurred in such arbitration, if
necessary. These implications are in direct antagonism to the main ground
of defense set up, namely, that the alleged policy of insurance was not in
force."' 45
The Supreme Court of Ohio advanced a contrary opinion as to this
"direct antagonism"-at least in its broad statement as set out in the fore-
going Montana opinion. That Court observed as follows:
"A denial of ultimate liability is not necessarily a denial of the amount
of the loss, and in many cases-perhaps in most eases-there is nothing
inconsistent in demanding a compliance with the conditions agreed upon
for ascertaining the amount of loss or damage, and at the same time
insisting that there are legal defenses to any liability whatever . . .. The
insurers have not deluded the insured into a failure to comply with the
arbitration clause. On the contrary they have persistently kept it before
the insured, and demanded compliance with it. Under our Code of Civil
Procedure a defendant may set forth in his answer as many grounds of
defense, counterclaim, or set-off as he may have, provided that they are so
far consistent that they can be verified by oath without swearing falsely ....
There is no inconsistency nor any implied falsehood in the insurer swearing
that he believes that the insured set his store on fire, or that he violated
the conditions of the policy as to the storage of kerosene, and at the same
time and in the same answer swearing that the insured neglected or refused
to arbitrate as to the amount of his loss, when the parties to the contract
differed on that point." 4'
This idea that the demand by the insurer for appraisal is a concession on its part
of liability for sonic amount appears to have only limited sponsorship in the opinions.
See larowitz v. Fire Ins. Co., 129 Tenn. 691, 168 S.W. 163 (1914) (expressly relying
on the Ifickerson ease, sirora; also Gulf Compress Co. v. Insurance Co., 129 Teln. 586,
167 SW. 859 (1914); Honie Fire Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 47 Neb. 138, 66 N.W. 278
(1896) -quoted with approval in Aetna iss. Co. v. Sinmons, 49 Neb. 811, 69 N.W.
125 (1896). In Nebraska these appraisal provisions have been held revocable at all
events (i.e., regardless of "waiver") as attempts to "oust the courts of their jurisdiction."
See also Mississippi Fire Ins. Co. v. Dixon, 133 Miss. 570, 98 So. 101 (1923), but
comoare Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Conner, 223 Miss. 799, 79 So.2d 236 (1955).
145. Savage v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 12 Mont. 458, 31 Pac. 66 (1892).
146. Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Carnahan, 63 Ohio St. 258, 55 N.E. 805 (1900). Con-
sult also, Pollina v. State Mit. Rodded Fire Ins. Co., 249 Mich. 121, 227 N.W. 765
(1929).
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The general concept of inconsistency between the demand and the
denial also is discarded by some authorities when the insurer's denial of
liability occurs for the first time in its answer in the action brought by the
insured to collect on the policy; it does not "waive" the insurer's rights
under the appraisal provision, nor, it seems, prejudice its prior demand
for appraisal. 14
7
It also has been held that when the parties had gone first to appraisal
and award and then the insurer lost on its defense of no liability, the award
fixed the amount of the insured's recovery. In so deciding the Supreme
Court of Texas supported its ruling as follows:
"The policy in question, as outlined in the statement of the court of
civil appeals, does not expressly provide that, in the event an appraisement
is demanded, it shall be equivalent to an admission of liability, or that,
if the liability be contested, the appraisement shall go for naught. On
the contrary, it provides first that 'the loss shall be ascertained by appraise-
ment,' without expressing any exception whatever, and then specially
stipulates that 'any proceeding relative to the appraisement should not
waive any of the conditions of the policy.' From the latter provision we
think it is to be inferred that the parties contemplated that there might
be an appraisement binding upon the parties, and at the same time a
denial of liability on the ground of a breach of one or more of the
conditions of the contract. There being no stipulation to the effect that
the appraisement should be of no force in the event the company should
contest its liability in a suit for the loss, the provision as to the appraisement
was not waived by the terms of the policy; and since the appraisement
did not in any manner embarrass the insured in prosecuting their suit to
recover on the policy, and since whatever labor and expense which attended
the appraisement could have been incurred if there was no contest of the
right to recover, we think there was no waiver of the condition as to
appraisement. The amount of the loss being determined, there was one
issue less to be tried, and to that extent the prosecution of the suit was
less burdensome upon the plaintiffs by reason of the appraisement.""14
(Italics supplied).
(3) The insurer's denial or refusal to pay as a repudiation of its obliga-
tion to make "bona fide" effort to agree with the insured and settle the
amount of loss. This idea appears to be embraced in the above quoted
147. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Conner, 223 Miss. 799, 70 So.2d 236 (1955);
lome Ins. Co. v. Turner Watts, _._Ntiss., 91 So.2d 722 (1957); Murphy v.
Mercantile Co., 61 Mo. App. 323 (1895); Carp v. Queen Ins. Co., 104 Mo. App. 502,
79 SAV. 757 (1904). But see Kahn v. Traders Ins. Co., 4 Wyo. 419, 34 Pac.. 1059 (1893).
148. American Central Ins. Co. v. Bass, 90 Tex. 380, 38 S.\V. 1119 (1897).
Compare Pellicano v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 211 Minn. 314, 1 N.W.2d 354 (1941).
Consult further, Pioneer Mfg. Co. v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 106 N.C. 28, 10 S.E. 1057
(1890) (denial by insurer after insured had refused insurer's request to arbitrate the
amount of loss; held, no waiver).
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opinion of the Montana Court, urging the "direct antagonism" between
the implications of the insurer's demand for appraisal and its denial of
liability. As quoted above, the demand for appraisal implies, among other
things, "that defendant would have cooperated in seeking an agreement
as to the amount of loss, and [havc] concurred in such arbitration, if
any."' 49 The Supreme Court of Connecticut once put the matter somewhat
more positively and glossed the insurer's denial with some sin as follows:
"The defendant, by its refusal to recognize any obligation, at once
came under the condemnation of the law for not acting in good faith in
carrying out the provisions of the policy to secure an adjustment, and
justified a suit against it.'"""
It is difficult indeed to find any basis for posing the unconditional
and absolute implications of the demand for appraisal indicated by the
Montana Court, or for imputing, even to a fire insurance corporation, a
fault or want of "good faith" for putting a claimant, even the insured, to
suit to validate his claim in the courts. It may be emphasized in this
connection that the appraisal provision relates to differences over the
amount of loss and damage. While the amount to be paid is always a
significant concern of both parties in case of loss, the insurer may well
believe that on the facts in the given case, as it sees them, the insured
has breached important conditions or warranties on his part, or that lie
burned the property for the insurance money, or that he was intentionally
deceiving in inducing the coverage so as to have no just or valid claim
on the policy. Denial of liability on the policy on any such grounds raises
issues outside the purport of the appraisal provision. By the same token
it is difficult to give the denial any such effect in such instances as to
bring down the "condemnation of the law for not acting in good faith"
upon the insurer.
Concerning the view that the appraisal provision does not cover issues
raised by the denial or refusal to pay: This explanation alone is given in
the recent case of Hoime Ins. Co. v. Scott by the Circuit Court of Appeals,
to defeat the plea of the provision?' Said the Court:
149. To like effect see Bass v. Farmers Mut. Protective Fire Ins. Co., 21 Cal.
App. 2d 21, 68 P.2d 302 (1937); Ohio Farmers' Ins. Co. v. Vogel, 166 Ind. 239, 76
N.E. 977 1906).
150. rnhard v. Rochester German Ins. Co., 79 Conn. 388, 65 Ati. 134 (1906).
Like notion was once voiced by Lord Haldane, L.C., in the House of Lords, He
declared that the insurer by making defense against the policy (for alleged fraud and
arson by the insured) committed a "repudiation"; that it went "to the substance of the
whole contract"; and that it abrogated the whole policy contract, including the ap-
praisal provision therein. So, the provision could not be pleaded against the action.
Jureidini v. National British Ins. Co., 1915 A.C. 499, 1915 D. Ann. Cas. 327 (1915).
But see this case further, infra, note 155.
151. 46 F.2d 10, (6th Cir. 1930). The case was reversed on grounds not involving
this matter in 284 U.S. 177 (1931).
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"The contracts of insurance did not provide for arbitration of the
question of liability but of the amount of loss in case of disagreement.
The defendants denied liability before suit was brought and after it was
brought. Their defense went to the question of liability, not the amount
of loss. The question to be arbitrated was therefore never reached, and
defendants did not permit it to be reached. In this situation they cannot
say that suits on the policies cannot be maintained. "
52
This explanation for ruling out the insurer's plea of the appraisal
provision in these cases seems more substantial than the others. It is readily
verified by the terms fixing the coverage of the provision. Except in rare
instances' 53 the provision was limited in the earlier policies, and is limited
in the current standard policy forms, to differences over the amount of
loss and damage. This limited coverage has been recognized and emphasized
especially in the cases ruling its irrevocability. 1 4 Its limited coverage and
its tie-in with a clause to the effect that the award "shall not decide the
liability of the company" and with a "no action" clause to the effect that,
in event of difference over the amount of loss and damage, no action shall
lie to prove and collect any amount on the policy except that determined
by appraisal and award, constituted the basis upon which the British and
American courts first extricated the provision from the common law
tradition of revocability.
The plea of the provision in the cases now under consideration would
disregard the foregoing conditions upon which irrevocability is based. It
misconceives the scope of the provision. It would usc the provision to stay
or abate the insured's action in which the issues as raised in the insurer's
answer do not involve the determination of the parties' difference over the
amount of loss and damage and do involve a determination as to its liability
on the policy regardless of any amount of loss or damage.
152. Accord: Robinson v. National Fraternal League, 8 Conn. 707, 71 AtI. 1096
(1909); Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Badger, 53 Wis. 283, 10 N.\V. 504 (1881); Bailey v.
Aetna Ins. Co,, 77 Wis. 336, 46 NAV. 440 (1890).
Similarly, the award covers only the amount of loss and damage -not the issue
of liability. Stockton Works v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 98 Cal. 557, 33 Pac. 633 (1893);
-logadone v. Grange Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 133 Mich. 339, 94 NAV. 1045 (1903). Itasca
Paper Co. v. Niagara Falls Ins. Co., 175 Minn. 73, 220 N.W. 425 (1928); Salganik
v. United States Fire ins. Co., 80 N.H. 450, 118 Atl. 815 (1922).
It also has been held that an action to collect the amount of an award is neces-
sarily and properly based on the policy (and its validity) and the award- not upon the
award alone. British American Assur. Co. v. Darragh, 128 Fed. 890 (5th Cir. 1904);
Stockton Works v. Glens Falls Ins. Co. su pra; Soars v. ]lome Ins. Co. 140 Mass 345,
5 N.E. 149 (1885). See also, the Minnesota cases cited, infra, note 157.
153. See Jackson v. State Mut. Rodded Fire Ins. Co., 217 Mich. 301, 186 NA\T .
514 (1922); also cases cited, supra, notes 104 and 105.
154. It also is made apparent when the provision is compared with the arbitration
provisions in current usage. The latter generally embrace "any dispute" arising out
of or in connection with the container contract.
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In the light of these considerations it is surprising to find that tile
foregoing explanation in Home Ins. Co. v. Scott has not been used more
widely in ruling against the insurer's plea in the cases at hand.' 55
One further consideration arises in this connection. In ruling out the
plea of the provision in these cases the courts generally have pronounced
the denial or refusal by the insurer as constituting, as of the time it was
uttered, a "waiver" of the insurer's rights under the provision. Of course,
whether the plea is defeated on the ground stated in the Home Ins. Co.
case, or on the ground of "waiver," the result is the same. But the rationale
of ruling out the plea is of more importance. If the insurer were to include
among its pleas a plea of the provision so framed as to claim appraisal
conditionally, then in the event that the insurer's defense against the
policy failed, the plea should prevail. The rationale of the Home Ins. Co.
case would permit this more readily than the "waiver" view. It seems
that such a plea of the provision should be sustained,156
It is interesting to note that when the parties, insured and insurer
alike, are accorded remedy for positive enforcement of the appraisal pro-
155. In the light of this conclusion there seems to be no worthy basis to sustain
the plea even though the denial or refusal is first voiced in the insurer's answer to the
insured's action. The cases relying upon this tinsing of the denial to sustain the plea
are cited, supra, note 147.
As pointed out above, supra note 150, the House of Lords, through Lord laldane.
L.C., once identified the insurer's defense against the policy (fraud and arson by the
plaintiff) as a "repudiation" of the policy, including the appraisal provision therein.
Accordingly, it sustained the lower court's denial of the instrer's plea of (le appraisal
provision (covering as it did differences over the amount of loss and damage). The
insurer pleaded it along with the above defenses in bar of the insured's action. It was
Lord Haldane's opinion that the insurer's plea of arson and fraud by the insured con-
stituted "a repudiation on the part of the respondents [insurers] of their liability based
upon charges of fraud and arson, the effect of which, if they are right, is that all benefit
under the policy is forfeited. [Lord laldane knew at this time, and had reported the fact,
that the jury had found against the insurer on these defenses]. But one of the belle-
fits is the right to go to arbitration, and to establish your claim in a way which may, to
some people, scem preferable to proceeding in the Courts, and accordingly that is one
of the things which the appcllants [insurers] have, according to the respondents
[insured], forfeited with every other benefit under the contract.
"Now, my Lords, speakiisg for myself, when there is a repudiation which goes to
the substance of the whole contract I do not see how the person setting up that repudia-
tion can be entitled to insist on a subordinate term of the contract still being cnforced."
(Italics supplied to question what the words might mean) Jnreidili v. National British
Ins. Co., 1915 A.C. 499, 1915 i). Ann. Cas. 327 (1915).
It scems difficult to imagine a more fanciful indulgence in semantics in order to
deny the effect of the plea of the arbitration provision to defeat the insured's action
to gain the favorable verdict which it did.
It will be noted that at least two of the Lords were not taken by Lord Haldane's
,exploitation of "repudiation". They concurred in denying the plea of the provision
only onl the ground that the appraisal provision, limited as it was to differences over
loss and damage, did not cover the issues raised; that accordingly the provision could
not be pleaded in bar of the insured's action.
Twenty-seven years later the House of Lords found it proper finally to discard both
the make-up and the effect of the "repudiation" as accomplished by Lord Haldane.
Heyman v. Darwins Ltd., 1942 A.C. 356 (1942).
156. It is interesting in this connection to note the observations of Lord Dunedin
in Jureidini v. National British Ins. Co. supra, note 155. While concurring in the
foregoing detennination of Lord Haldaiie in denying the insurer's plea of tile appraisal
proiision, he also added this: "Personally I should rather like to reserve my opinion
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vision, the insured has been allowed to use that remedy and gain an
appraisal and an award of the amount of loss and damage notwithstanding
denial of liability by the insurer. The Supreme Court of Minnesota so
held under the appraisal provision in the standard policy of that state.
It also indicated that, under like circumstances, the insurer would be
accorded the remedy.'
57
Same-Whether or Not the Insurer Did Its Part In Arranging For the
Appraisal.
Once appraisal has been duly demanded the insurer must do its part
in making the necessary arrangements for the appraisal.
The important first step in bringing on the appraisal is that of setting
up the appraisal board. Under the more prevalent appraisal provision this
is to be accomplished by each party selecting an appraiser and the two
appraisers appointing an umpire.
If the insurer defaults with respect to these matters so that the
appraisal is not accomplished, generally its rights under the appraisal
provision are thereby "waived;" and its plea of the provision fails. As
in case of other "waivers," the insurer's default is the insured's excuse
for maintaining his action to collect on the policy without appraisal.
It is frequently indicated in the opinions of the courts that it is the
common duty of the two parties to accomplish these arrangements. In
most of the pcrtinent cases, however, judicial inquiry has centered upon
the course of conduct of the insurer more than upon that of the insured.
In these cases the courts have determined the make-up of the insurer's
general obligation with respect to these matters and prescribed the rules
of trial procedure for deternining the validity of a claim of "waiver" against
the insurer in the given case.
As in other cases under review relating to waiver of the insurer's rights
under the appraisal provision, only rarely has the determination been made
"as a matter of law" cither on the pleadings, 1 8 or otherwise: 5D Generally
as to what would have been the effect if the respondents [insurers], instead of pleading
as they did, had pled this way: 'We will allow this question to he disposed of at law
by a jury as to whether there was fraud and arson or not', and had gone on to say,
'but in the event of that being negatived we wish this ascertainmuent of actoa daniage
to be ascertained by arbitration.' I should like to reserve my opinion on whether they
might have said so with effect."
157. Abramowitz v. Continental Is. Co., 170 Minn. 215, 212 N.V 449 (1927):
Itasca Paper Co. v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 175 Minn. 73, 220 N.V. 425 (1928); Orient
Ins. Co. v. Shillet Co., 28 172d 968 (8th Cir. 1928). Compare the Minnesota cases
cited, supra, note 138. Also, Saba v. Homeland Ins. Co., 159 Ohio St. 237, 112 N.E.2d
1 (1953).
158. Of course the issue may be so presented and determined. See, e.g., Western
Assur. Co. v. Hall Bros.,, 143 Ala. 853, 38 So 853 (1905) (decision on insured's de-
murrer to insurer's plea); Provident Washington Ins, Co. v. Wolf, 168 Ind. 690, 80
N.E. 26 (1907) (decision on insurer's demurrer to insured's complaint; and on in-
surer's demurrer to insured's reply); Vernon Ins. Co. v. Maitlen, 158 Ind. 393, 63 N.E.
755 (1902) (decision on insurer's demurrer to insured's complaint).
159. Exceptional process is available under the Minnesota standard policy legisla-
tion to challenge and have adjudicated the qualifications of a nominee for appraiser or
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the insured sues to collect on the policy; the insurer pleads non-compliance
with the appraisal provision; and the insured, in his case, as upon reply,
brings forward evidence of the insurer's conduct by way of excuse for no
appraisal or award. This issue is tried along with the merits of the insured's
claim to collect and the amount thereof. Generally the case is tried before
a jury; the necessary constituency of waiver is determined by the court;
whether or not the insurer did make a waiver in the given case is determined
by the jury. Verdict of waiver against the insurer overcomes the plea of
the provision and permits the insured to take judgment, if the validity of
his claim is established, and for the amount of loss as determined by
the jury.
The appellate courts review the adequacy of the evidence to go to the
jury on the issue of "waiver" and the adequacy thereof to sustain a verdict.
Generally the courts have ruled in favor of the adequacy for both pur-
poses.10 And so, as in other cases of claim to "waiver" by the insured, the
appraisal provision is first put to trial by jury as to whether or not it has
been "waived." It is further displaced for, on the assumption, as it were,
that insured's claim to waiver will prove true, the amount of loss and
damage also is sent to the jury.10 1
The general obligation of the insurer with respect to these preliminary
arrangements has been written in broad and comprehensive terms. It must
be diligent in its own performance of the appraisal provision which it has
invoked by its plea. It is duty-bound to act in good faith to bring about
the appraisal-and to bring it about promptly. Its refusal or neglect to do
so is competent and sufficient evidence of "waiver." Its failure to act
promptly and its unexplained delay permit "adverse inferences" of its
umpire. Alnerican Central Ins. Co. v. District Court, 125 Minn, 374, 147 N.W. 242
1914); see also Mowry & Payson v. Hanover Fire Ins. Co., 106 Me. 308, 76 At]. 875
1909) reported infra, note 186, 187.
160, Accordingly it is hazardous for a trial court to direct a verdict for the insurer
on this issue or to direct a judgment for the insurer notwithstanding verdict. See e.g.,
Hall Bros. v. Wcsteni Assur, Co., 133 Ala. 637, 32 So. 257 (1901); O'Rourk v. German
Ins. Co., 96 Minn. 154, 104 N.W. 900 (1905); Uhrig v. Williamsburgh City Fire Ins.
Co., 101 N.Y. 362, 4 N.E. 745 (1886). See also, Knox-Burchard Mercantile Co. v.
Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 129 Minn. 292, 152 NAV. 650 (1915) (case tried to the court
without jury; trial court found waiver; order of the court denying insurer's inotion for
judgment on the pleadings sustained on appeal. "We find" said the Court, "no suf-
ficient reason for disapproving that conclusion"; this, although the Court also considered
it "reasonably clear from the evidence that the jury" might have found a verdict for the
defendant [insurer]."
Compare Western Assur. Co. v. Hall Bros., 120 Ala. 547, 24 So. 936 (1898);
Silver v. Western Assur. Co., 164 N.Y. 381, 58 N.E. 284 (1900); Williams v. German
Ins. Co., 90 App. l)iv. 413, 86 N.Y. Supp. 98 (4th Dcp't 1904); American Central
Ins. Co. v. Terry, 298 S.W. 658 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927). Thllese cases are among the
comparatively few American cases ruling the evidence insufficient to sustain a verdict
of waiver against insurer. See also Westenhaver v. German-American Ins. Co., 113
Iowa 726, 84 N.XV. 717 (1900) (the court declaring that the "scintilla doctrine" has
been abolished).
161. See, e.g., cases cited infra note 170 and Knox-Burchard Mercantile Co. v.
Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 129 Minn. 292, 152 N.W. 650 (1915).
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purpose to squeeze the insured in his adversity or to pressure a compromise
settlement.
The general admonition of the New York Court of Appeals in Uhrig
v. Williamsburg City Fire Ins. Co.,' 5 ' in 1886, has been widely approved
by other courts. Earle J. addressed the opinion of the Court toward "each
party" as follows:
Under the arbitration clause, it was the duty of each party
to act in good faith to accomplish the appraisement in the way
provided in the policy, and if either party acted in bad faith so
as to defeat the real object of the clause, it absolved the other
party from compliance therewith; and if either party refused to go
on with the arbitration, or to complete it, or to procure the appoint-
ment of an umpire so that there could be an agreement upon an
appraisal, the other party was absolved. A claimant under such a
policy cannot be tied up forever without his fault and against his
will by an ineffectual arbitration. 6 3
In Powers Dry Goods Co. v. Imperial Iris. Co.16' decided in 1892, the
Supreme Court of Minnesota advanced a like view, relying upon the Uhrig
opinion. It particularized a little more, however, the requirements of prompt
action and cooperation with the insured, as follows:
One of the reasons for the insertion of provisions of this kind
in policies of insurance is to provide a mcans for the speedy settle-
ment and adjustment of the loss; and, as such a provision can only
be carried into effect by the concurrent action of both parties,
neither can, rightfully, refuse to act with reasonable promptness,
when the other demands that such action be taken. Neither can
rightfully postpone his concurrent action for the purpose of forcing
the other to a settlement. If one in bad faith prevents or postpones
unreasonably the carrying into effect of this stipulated method of
adjusting the rights of the parties, by refusing to participate
where his participation is necessary, lie ought not to be heard to
plead, in defense of an action to recover upon the contract, that
the stipulated mode of adjustment has not been pursued.'
162. 101 N.Y, 362, 4.N.E. 745 (1886). Compare Silver v. Western Assur. Co.,
164 N.Y. 381, 58 N.E. 284 (1900).
163. See to like effect, I rovident Wash. Ins. Co. v. 'Volf, 168 Ind. 690, 80 N.E.
26 (1907) and cases reviewed therein. Consult further, Shapiro v. Mutual Fire Ins.
Co., 219 Mich. 581, 189 N.W. 202 (1922). -
164. 48 Minn. 380, 51 N.W. 123 (1892).
165. While, as indicated above in the text, these opinions and others pose a coln-
mon obligation of the two parties to bring on the appraisal, they are, in trnth generally
being addressed to the insurer. The insurer is not trying to collect on the policy; it is
never the "claimant," who may not "be tied up forever." The insured is not in any
position to use delaying tactics with respect to the appraisal to force the insurer to a
settlement. If the insured defaults in his obligations for the appraisal, lie does not collect;
the plea of the appraisal provision stands.
Only rarely has the insured been judged for his bona fide efforts in these matters
and found wanting. It has happened, however. See Silver v. Western Assur. Co., 164
N.Y. 381, 58 N.E. 284 (1900); Reilly v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 311 Ill. App. 562,
37 N.E.2d 352 (1911); also Hyland v. Millers Nat. Ins. Co., 91 F.2d 755 (9th Cir.
1937).
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The foregoing admonition in the Uhrig case is made more meaningful
by reference to the evidence in the case and the role given the jury
under the precise ruling of the Court. Apparently the trial court dismissed
the insured's complaint after trial and entered judgment for the insurer.
This was reversed.
The loss occurred on July 30, 1882. The insured gave notice of loss
to the insurer on the following day. On August 2, 1882, the insurer
demanded arbitration of the amount of loss and the insured agreed.
Thereupon the insured appointed one I)e Andreau and the insurer, one
Magnus, as arbitrators. It is inferred that no umpire was appointed. The
two appraisers failed to agree upon the amount of the loss.
The Court reported upon the further evidence in tile case as follows:
The defendant gave evidence tending to show that it subse-
quently made plaintiff an offer to appoint a new arbitrator in the
place of Magnus, and also that Magnus offered to unite with
i)e Andreau in selecting an umpire, but that the plaintiff and
De Andrean refused. The plaintiff, as a witness in his own behalf,
gave evidence tending to show that, after the arbitrators failed to
agree, lie requested the defendant to appoint another arbitrator,
and that he asked Magnus to agree with De Andreau in appointing
an umpire, and they did not accede to his requests.
After voicing the requirements of the situation as set out in the
admonition quotcd above, the Court concluded:
(1) The evidence tended to show that the defendant failed
and refused to go on with the arbitration [This evidence, so far
as the report of the case shows, consisted of the above testimony
of the insured which contradicted that of the insurer as quoted
above]. (2) There was some evidence tending to show, and from
which a jury might have inferred, that the defendant was not
acting in good faith to procure a speedy appraisal, and was inter-
posing this clause in the policy for the purpose of forcing a com-
promise from the plaintiff. [This evidence is not reported].6"6
In affirming the rcvcrsal of the trial court, the Court said:
"Upon all the evidence, it was a question of fact for the jury to
determine whether there was any breach of this clause [the
appraisal provision] in the policy on the part of the plaintiff and
166. The Court also noted that sometime during the period following the loss the
damaged property and debris had been removed from the insured's premises "partly
under the orders of the city authorities," wherefore, "an appraisal" said the Court, "had
become to a large extent impractical." The Court seems to have made nothing of
the point beyond reporting it. It is not clear how this fact would be material on the
issue of waiver unless it was used to suggest that the appraisal may have become more
difficult, thereby aggravating the insurer's alleged default in furthering the appraisal.
Quite clearly the appraisal had not been rendered impossible; certainly the amount of
loss and damage could be determined as readily by appraisers as by jury trial. And it
seems clear that no such aggravation is necessary to the insured's case for waiver.
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the case should thus have been submitted to them."' 67 (Italics
supplied)
Under this ruling the jury becomes the final judge as to what was
the truth in the foregoing conflicting testimony. And when the jury is
persuaded by the insured's testimony that the insurer refused to cooperate
with insured to overcome the impasse which overtook the two appraisers,
or when the jury is persuaded by insured's evidence that the insurer has
not acted in good faith to procure an early appraisal, the insurer's rights
under the appraisal provision are thereby foreclosed. Persuasion of the
jury is readily accomplished in both situations on little evidence.
Given the foregoing widely accepted statements by the New York
and Minnesota courts of the general scope and content of the responsi-
bilities of the parties with respect to the pre-appraisal arrangements and
the role of the jury, it remains to point out their application to various
situations arising in the course of such arrangements.
The appraisal provisions involved in the cases under review generally
have not contained any time schedules for carrying out any of the steps
involved in these arrangements. Moreover, those provisions have generally
prescribed no formalities or special procedures for any of these steps.
Exceptions are noted below.
Selection of appraisers-time limitations-procedures. While the
appraisal provisions covered by the more common standard policy legislation
carry some time schedule bearing upon the parties' nomination and appoint-
ment of appraisers, those time schedules have become involved only rarely
in the adjudicated cases. And most of the appraisal provisions under which
waiver has been resolved did not carry such limitation, or it was not
brought into the case.
Although no time schedule for the nomination and appointment of
appraisers is prescribed, it seems clear that the general requirement of
prompt action leading to an early appraisal as advanced by the New
York and Minnesota courts gives the insurer only "a reasonable time"
within which to select a qualified person as appraiser. It is, of course,
within the insurer's control to take such action. It seems that this
reasonable-time limitation should start with the date appraisal was duly
demanded. It also seems clear that the question whether or not the
time which has been allowed to elapse with no such action by the insurer
is an unreasonable delay is for the jury to determine from the evidence
167. While the insurer's waiver is offered by the insured as excuse or justification
for non-compliance with the appraisal provision, it will be noted that the excuse in-
volved in these cases is only for non-compliance with the appraisal provision. And so,
if a burden of proof to establish the excuse is to be allocated to the insured, the fore-
going cases teach how light is that burden. See also Molea v. Aetna Ins. Co., 326
Mass. 542, 95 N.E.2d 749 (1950).
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in the particular case.' When the insured presses the insurer for quick
action in this matter, and the insurer disregards the request, quite clearly
such "silent treatment" for a relatively short period of time becomes
competent evidence of waiver."'
If one duly appointed as appraiser dies, resigns or otherwise fails to
act, it seems clear that the appointing party is called upon (regardless of
any demand of the other party) to appoint a qualified substitute promptly
in order to satisfy his obligations under the appraisal provision.'" It seems
equally clear that he is entitled to a reasonable time in which to select
the substitute before he can be counted in default under the provision.
When the insured objects to the person designated by the insurer as
appraiser or the insurer objects to the one designated by the insured, a
reasonable time is allowable for the parties to resolve the objection. When
the insurer responds with reasonable promptness to persuade away the
objection and with an offer to substitute another if the persuasion fails,
it is not apparent why the insurer should be chargeable with dereliction
under its foregoing general obligation to cooperate in the accomplishment
of an early appraisal. If the insurer objects to the insured's selection, it
likewise seems clear that a reasonable time is allowable to press its objection
and demand that the insured make another appointment."' Selection
of a substitute is fully within the control of each party; and reasonable
confidence of the parties in the persons to serve as appraisers is likely
to facilitate the appraisal.
If the impasse over the appointment of appraisers continues beyond
a reasonable time either by reason of the insured's insistence on his appoint-
ncnt notwithstanding insurer's objection, or by reason of the insurer's
persistence in its appointment notwithstanding the insured's objection,
the insured has no other recourse under most of the appraisal provisions
than to bring suit to collect on the policy.'72 Upon the insurer's plea
168. Consult Provident Wash. Ins. Co. v. Wolf, 168 Ind. 690, 80 N.E. 26, (1907);
National Fire Ins. Co. v. Piuncll, 199 Ky. 624, 251 S.\'. 651 (1923).
It also may be inferred frorn the foregoing Indiana ease that the provision in the
policy to the effect that the loss shall not become payable until sixty days after proof
of loss, or subsequent events if they transpire, does not permit the insurer to use n1
that period as matter of right before taking the required steps to arrange the appraisal
169. See Milwaukee Mechanics' Ins. Co. v. Schallrnan, 188 Ill. 213, 59 N.E. 12
(1900); Aaberg v. Minnesota Comm. Men's Ass'n., 152 Minn. 478, 189 N.W. 434
(19221; Schonweller v. Merchants' Mut. Ins. Co., 11 S.D. 401, 78 N.W. 356 (1899).
170. See, Westem Assur. Co. v. tall, 120 Ala. 547, 24 So. 936 (1898); Provi-
dence Wash. Ins. Co. v. Wolf, 168 Ind. 690, 80 N.E. 26 (1907); Fire Ass'n. of Phila.
v. Appel, 76 Ohio St. 1, 80 N.E. 952 (1907): Harrison v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 80
N.W. 309 (Iowa 1899); Compare Mowry v. Hlanover Fire Ins. Co., 106 Me. 308, 76
AtI. 875 (1909); reported infra, note 186, 187.
171. See eases cited supra, note 170; compare Knox-Burchard Mercantile Co. v.
Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 128 Minn. 292, 152 N.W. 650 (1915).
172. Compare the procedure available under the Minnesota standard policy regis-
lation. American Central Ins. Co. v. District Court, 125 Minn. 374, 147 N.W. 242
(1914).
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of non-compliance with the appraisal povision the validity of the challenged
appointment will come in issue. That issue, under the usual appraisal
provision, will involve a determination of whether or not the appointee
was "competent and disinterested." Generally the jury will return the
answer under proper instructions of the trial court as to the legal constitu-
ency of this qualification requirement.", 3
It seems clear that neither party may claim any credit as for bona
fide effort in selecting appraisers if he nominates a person as appraiser
knowing him to be disqualified unless and until the other party approves
the nominee knowing of the disqualification."1 When such nominee is
approved by the other party without knowledge of the disqualification,
it also seems clear that the appointing party remains in default under
the appraisal provision and when the insurer has made the appointment
it should be sufficient evidence of waiver.17 5
Suppose that a party has, in good faith, appointed one whom he
believes to be a competent and disinterested person as appraiser, but the
appointee undertakes his office demonstrating what appears to be bias
and partisan aid for the party appointing him. It seems clear that the
appointing party will disregard a challenge by the other party of the
appointment at his peril of the jury finding the challenge valid and of
being held in default under the appraisal provision-a waiver by the
insurer.'"6
But suppose in such case both appointees are challenged; that both
have proved themselves disqualified in the course of the appraisal or the
173. See Hall Bros. v. Western Assur. Co., 133 Ala. 637, 32 So. 257 (1901);
National Fire Ins. Co. v. O'Bryan, 75 Ark. 198, 87 S.V. 129 (1905); Knox-Burehard
Mercantile Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 129 Minn. 292, 152 N.W. 650 (1915); Dela-
ware Underwriters Fire Ins. Co. v. Brock, 109 'rex. 425, 211 S.W. 779 (1911).
174. Hyland v. Millers Nat'l Ins. Co., 91 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1937); Hall Bros. v.
Western Assur. Co., 133 Ala. 637, 32 So. 257 (1901); Knox-Burchard Mercantile Co.
v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 129 Minn. 292, 152 N.W. 650 (1915). See also Bradbury v.Rhode Island Ins. Co., 120 Me. 1, 112 Atl. 714 (1921); Bradbury v. Ins. Co., 118
Me. 191, 106 Aft. 862 (1919); Kaiser v. tarnhurg-Bremen Fire Ins. Co., 59 App. Div.
525, 69 N.Y.S. 344 (1901).
175. See cases supra, note 174. Compare what seems to have been an indulgent
overlooking of the questionable qualifications of the insured's appointee in Westen-
hayer v. German-American Ins. Co., 113 Iowa 726, 84 N.W. 717 (1900).
It also seems clear that the appointment by either party of one as appraiser with
an understanding (express or tacit) that he will serve the interest of the party appointing
him during the appraisal is a default under the appraisal provision and when made
by the insurer is sufficient evidence of waiver. Of course, generally, evidence of anysuch understanding will not appear until the appointee demonstrates his dereliction in
the course of his office. Such demonstration alone mav be sufficient to require his
displacement and to work default or waiver if the appointing party fails or neglects
to remove him. On the other hand, proof of the initial understanding when available,
will make sure the appointing party's own "fault" in the matter and preclude any
disclaimer by hint of responsibility for the misconduct of the appointee. ConsultHyland v. Millers Nat'l. Ins. Co., 91 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1937); Hall Bros. v. Western
Assur. Co., 133 Ala., 637, 32 So. 257 (1907); Continental Ins. Co. v. Vallandingham,116 Ky. 287, 76 S.W. 22 (1903); Pretzfelder & Co. v. Merchants' Ins. Co., 116 N.C.
491, 21 S.E. 302 (1895).
176. See cases cited supra, note 175.
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preliminary arralgements. It has been held that such finding as against
the insurer's appointee is competent and sufficient evidence of waiver of the
appraisal provision by the insurer, regardless of the contemporary finding
against the insured's appointee. The Court of Appeals of Kentucky
explained such a ruling as follows:
"But if a person for whose benefit a clause in a contract is inserted
would have the advantage of it, he must bring himself within its terms,
and will not be excused because the other party had likewise failed. Unless
the insurer asks for the arbitration or appraisal before suit brought, the
failure to appraise is not a defense . . . And when the insurer demands
the appraisal, it must in good faith nominate a competent, disinterested
1)erson as appaiser, before it can defend upon the ground that the insured
has failed to keep that part of his contract.'' 7
Mvodern standard policy legislation indicates a purpose to supplement
the general obligation declared by the courts that the insurer act promptly
cnd cooperate to bring on an early appraisal by fixing time schedules for
a lpointing the appraisers. While there is some variation in these schedules,
they indicate a common purpose to aid the insured to work waiver against
the insurer if it does not comply.
The appraisal provision in the New York standard policy form fixes
a time schedule for appointing appraisers as follows: When the parties
fail to agree upon the amount of loss or damage, "then, on the written
demand of either, each shall select a competent and disinterested appraiser
and notify the other of the appraiser selected within twenty days of such
demand."17 (Italics supplied).
Maine and Massachusetts have not only time schedules for appointing
appraisers but also special procedures therefor as indicated below.
Minnesota has an over-all time limitation for demanding appraisal
as follows: "Unless within fifteen days after a statement of such loss
has been rendered to the company, cither party, the assured or the company,
shall have notified the other in writing that such party demands an
appraisal, such right to an appraisal shall be waived."17"' (Italics supplied)
With reference to the selection of appraisers the Minnesota statute pro-
vides for the insured and the company each selecting one within fifteen
177. Continental Ins. Co. v. Vallandinghamn, 116 Ky. 287, 76 S.W. 22 (1903).
Accord, Delaware Underwriters Fire Ins. Co. v. Brock, 109 Tex. 425, 211 S.W. 779
(1911). Consult also Fowble v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 106 Mo App. 527, 8 S.W.
485 (1909bl
178. Xhile its context is not entirely clear, it is inferred that "the written
demand" refers to a written demand to select appraisers (rather than any demand
for appraisal) and that the selection and notification are due within twenty days of
that demand. Compare the variations in the pertinent terms of the Maine and
Massachusetts legislation reported later in the text.
179. NlN. STAT. § 65.01 (1953).
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days after a statement of loss has bcen rendered to the company, and in
case either party fails to select an appraiser within such time, the other
appraiser and the umpire selected as provided in the statute, may act as
a board of appraisers.1 0
The text of the appraisal provision in the Massachusetts standard
policy as written in the current standard policy does not prescribe a
time or procedure for appointing appraisers.18 ' Apparently, however,
earlier legislation is still alive which provides as follows: If the parties
fail to agree upon the amount of loss, "the company shall, within ten
days after receiving a written demand from the insured for the reference
of the amount of loss to three referees as provided in such policy, submit
in writing the names and addresses of three persons to the insured,8 2 who
shall, within ten days after receiving such names, notify the company in
writing of his choice of one of the said persons to act as one of said
referees." With respect to correlative action of the insured, the statute
reads: "The insured shall submit in writing the names and addresses of
three persons to the company, which shall, within ten days after receiving
such names, notify the insured in writing of its choice of one of said
persons to act as one of said referees."
183
The statute further provides that "every person nominated" as a
referee shall be "willing to act as referee."'
1 4
Maine has similar legislation providing as follows: Upon failure of
the parties to agree "if the insurance company shall not, within 10 days
after a written request to appoint referees . . . name 3 men under such
provision, each of whom shall be a resident of this state and willing to
act as one of such referees; or if such insurance company shall not,
within 10 days after receiving the names of 3 men named by the insured
under such provision, make known to the insured its choice of one of
180. MINN. STAT. § 65.01 (1953).
These time limitations have been considered in the following Minnesota cases
involving sonic aspect of the enforcement remedies provided by the Minnesota statute.
Boston Ins. Co. v. Jacobson Co., 226 Minn. '79, 33 N.W.2d 602 (1948); Kavli v.
Eagle Star ins. Co., 206 Minn. 360, 288 N.V. 723 (1939); Minnesota Farmers Mut.
Iis. Co. v. Smart, 204 Minn. 101, 282 N.W. 658 (1938). They are reviewed infra,
§ 8, "Enforcement of Appraisal Provisions."
181. MASS. ANN. LAws, c. 175, § 99 (1954).
182. While this text says that the company shall submit its names of referees"within ten days after receiving a written demand for the reference," (see also Molea v.
Aetna Ins. Co., 326 Mass. 542, 95 N.E. 2d 749 (1950) (the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts has said this: "It is only in case of the failure of the parties to agree
as to the amount of the loss, and withn ten days after a written request to appoint
referees under the provision for arbitration in the policy, that the insurance company
is required by the statute to name three men under such provision." (Italics supplied.)
Vera v. Mercantile Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 216 Mass. 154, 103 N.E. 292 (1913).
183. MAss. ANN. LAWS, c. 175, § 100 (1954). The Company or its agent who"wilfully refuses to comply" with the provsisions of this return (§ 100) "shall be
punished by a fine of not less than one hundred nor more than five hundred dollars."
184. MASS. ANN. LAWS, C. 175, § 100B (1954).
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them to act as one of such referees, it shall be deemed to have waived the
right to an arbitration under much policy and be liable to suit thereunder,
as though the same contained no provision for arbitration as to the
amount of loss or damage."'
18 5
It is thought likely that the courts will hold such time limitations and
procedural provisions for appointing appraisers "mandatory" and not
"directory" as against the insurer, to the end that almost any non-com-
pliance by the insurer will work "waiver" of its rights under the appraisal
provision.
A ruling by a majority of the Supreme Court of Maine in Mowry v.
Hanover Fire Ins. Co., 86 in 1909, in administering its statute quoted above
is suggestive in this connection. It involved the requirement that the
insurance company shall name 3 men who are "willing to act as one
of such referees" from whom the insured may choose one, and the provision
that if the company fails to comply "it shall be deemed to have waived
the right to an arbitration."
The insurer duly named three persons within the required ten day
period; each was a resident of the state, and each, before his nomination,
had stated to the insurer that he was willing to serve if chosen by the
insured. The insured thereafter chose one of the three, a Mr. Brackett.
Three days later Brackett informed the insurer that on account of his
father's death and the demands of his regular business he could not
serve. "The next day," as reported in the opinion, "the defendant informed
the plaintiff by letter of Mr. Brackett's inability to serve stating that it
would 'do whatever is necessary to bring the reference about at once,'
and three days later submitted the name of another person in place of Mr.
Brackett." The insured refused to make another choice claiming that
the insurer could not submit a substitute and brought suit to collect on
the policy. Held that, under the foregoing statute, the insurer had
"waived" its right to appraisal. The Court indicated that it would hold
likewise if Brackett had died or had otherwise become incapable of
serving as a referee.' 87
185. REV. STATS., C. 60, §§ 105, 108.
Concerning how dubious of merit is this process under the Massachusetts and
Maine statute for selecting appraisers, see Young v. Aetna Insurance Co., 101 Me. 294,
64 At. 584 (1906); Christianson v. Norwich Union Fire Ins. Co., 84 Minn. 526,
88 N.M. 16 (1901).
186. 106 Me. 308, 76 AtI. 875 (1909).
187. The Court was not persuaded by the insurer's argument that this would be
an unreasonable construction of the statute because the construction would "make
the company guarantee that the persons named by it for referees should not only be
willing to serve when named, but that they shall remain alive and able and willing
to serve during the entire limit of two years within which the action may be commenced."
Nor could the Court regard the foregoing provision of the statute as being
merely "directory"; it must be construed as "imperative and controlling."
The Court felt that the statute required the insurer to name those who were
willing to act not only when nominated hut also when chosen by the insured; that
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Reference also will be made to the attitude of the California courts
toward certain pertinent provisions in former standard policy legislation
of that state which accorded the insured express authority to escape appraisal
in situations indicated therein. According to the statute the insured could
disregard the appraisal provision and sue to collect on his policy "if for
any reason not attritbutable to the insured, or to the appraiser appointed
by him," appraisement was not "had and completed" within ninety days
after his preliminary proofs of loss to the insurer. It is clear enough that
in administering this statutory provision the California courts were
it gave the insurer no right to submit a substitute for the one declining to serve or
to name three new ones-at least not after the ten-day period had expired.
And while the insurer's good faith was not questioned in this case, the waiver
was said to be derived from the very text of the statute. The insurer, according to the
Court, "failed to comply with the imperative terms and absolute conditions of the
statute, and must be held legally responsible for the failure of the arbitration and
according to the language of the statute 'be deemed to have waived the right to it.'
It is not a question of the good faith or actual intentions of the defendant. It is
not an intentional waiver, but a statutory waiver that deprives the defendant of the
right to arbitration."
While the statute did not cover the contingency under consideration, the Court
speculated upon what might happen in other cases (not like this one) if the insurer
were to be allowed to nominate either a successor for Brackett, or a new panel of
three. "By selecting Mr. Brackett as referee in this case," the Court argued, "the
plaintiff thereby distinctly preferred him to the other two and by implication necessarily
rejected the other two. It would be an injustice to compel the plaintiff to accept one
of those men after Mr. Brackett declined to serve, and if the opportunity were given
the defendant to designate a new man in place of Mr. Brackett, the plaintiff would
be practically forced to accept any name which the defendant might deem it advan-
tageous to present.
"Again if the Court should assume to establish a rule that would authorize the
men named by the defendant for referees to refuse to serve after the expiration of
ten days, and still permit the defendant to retain the benefit of the arbitration clause
irrespective of the limitation of time now prescribed by the statute it is evident that
through the adroit management of a zealous insurance agent, the insured would in
some instances be effectually deprived of the choice given him by the statute and find
himself reduced to the necessity of accepting for referee the only one who had not
declined to serve and the one especially desired by the defendant." (italics supplied
to question the plausibility of these speculations as to the destitute position of the
insured in the situations posed, if they were to happen.)
None of these what-might-happen situations was in issue in this case: Were they
to come about, judgment of their consequences upon the appraisal provision could then
be made. They can hardly serve as substantial support for the absolutism of "waiver"
which the majority ruled on this case. (Three justices, including the Chief Justice,
dissented.)
The Court relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in
Mc Dowell v. Aetna Ins. Co., 164 Mass. 444, 41 N.E. 665 (1895) applying the
Massachusetts statute then having like provision for waiver.
In that case, however, the insurers had paid no attention to the insured's request
to appoint referees for a period extending beyond the ten-day period.
There is considerable irony in the history of the case for the insured if he were
seeking quick settlement of his claim. The fire occurred June 4, 1907; insured made
proof of loss July 25, 1907; insured requested reference on September 9, 1907; in-
sured rejected insurer's offer of a substitute for Brackett on October 30, 1907, and
started suit on the policy on that date. The case came to the Supreme Court on
exceptions to a ruling of the trial court on an agreed statement of facts involving a
ruling on the question of waiver. The trial court ruled that the insurer had not waived
its rights to arbitration. The issue was decided by the Supreme Court December 20,
1909. When the insured may have obtained a judgment for his loss does not appear.
Total elapsed time, July 4, 1907-December 20, 1909; time elapsed in connection with
the appraisal September 9, 1907-October 30, 1907; time elapsed in the litigation as
reported, October 30, 1907-December 20, 1909.
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reluctant indeed to attribute default to the insured. Instead, they would
be solicitous to conclude in the given case that failure of the appraisal was
for a reason "not attributable to the insured, or to the appraiser appointed
by him."'88
In Hyland v. Millers Nat. Irs. Co.,"" however, a majority, but only a
majority, of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit did sustain
the finding and decision of the District Court, sitting in equity, which
ttributed default to the insured under the foregoing California provision.
The Court below had sustanied the insurers' contention that the insured had
appointed one as appraiser who was not "disinterested," and who was in secret
collusion with the insured to cheat the insurers. There was substantial
evidence that, before the fire, the insured's appointee had been bought
and paid for by the insured in a clandestine course of commercial bribery;
also that both of them understood that as the insured's appraiser he would
serve the insured in his plans to cheat and defraud the insurers in the
settlement of this loss. On such evidence it was clear that the insured
was so wanting in "clean hands" as to be disqualified to claim escape from
appraisal as contemplated by the above provision of the statute.
Appointment of umpire-time limitations-procedures. Most of the
appraisal provisions involved in the waiver cases now under consideration
have prescribed that the two appraisers selected by the parties should
appoint an umpire. Various time schedules and procedures for appointing
the umpire have been included in standard policy legislation. They have
not been in issue in many cases; they are reviewed below.
Frequently the appraisers fail to agree upon an umpire and return
no award. Along the line, sometime after the appraisers have been selected,
but before they have agreed upon an umpire, the insured has started suit
to collect on the policy. He has relied upon circumstances attending the
failure of the appraisers up to the time of his suit to appoint an umpire
to excuse himself from further regard for the appraisal provision.
Absent controlling time schedules and special procedures, the courts
have been called upon to determine how the general obligation of the
insurer to cooperate in accomplishing an early appraisal should be applied.
One of the initial problems arising in this connection has been whether
or not the parties should be chargeable with the conduct of their respective
appointees in their failure to appoint an umpire, and if so, under what
circumstances?
This problem is derived from the widely accepted view that once the
appraisers are appointed, each shall, by virtue of his office, forego any role
188. See Koyer v. Detroit Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 2d 336, 70 P.2d 927
(1937 This ease is reviewed infra, note 192.
189. 91 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1937); petition for rehearsing denied, 92 F.2d 462
(9th Cir. 1937).
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of "agent" or "partisan" for the party appointing him; each is to perform
his duties without partiality for the party appointing him, and this duty
attends each of them in this very first step of completing the appraisal
board. The Supreme Court of Alabama put the matter as follows:
"In their selection [by the parties of the two appraisers] it is not
contemplated that they [the appraisers] shall represent either party to the
controversy or be a partisan in the cause of either, nor is an appraiser
expected to sustain the views or to further the interest of the party who
may have named him. And this is true, not only with respect to estimating
the amount of loss, but also with reference to the selection of an umpire."90
(Italics supplied.)
In line with this view, dictation by the insurer to the appraiser appointed
by it as to whom lie shall agree upon as umpire is competent and sufficient
evidence to work "waiver" of the appraisal provision. Thus, in the Minne-
sota case of Powers Dry Goods Co. vs. Imperial Fire Ins. Co.1If It was
shown that the insurer had directed the appraiser whom it bad appointed
to insist upon either A or B as umpire and to refuse all others. The
appraiser appointed by insured suggested persons other than A or B; the
insurer's appointee refused all of them. The insured's appointee accepted
A, but A declined to serve. Thereupon the insurer instructed its appointee
to take only B as umpire. On the next day, however, the insurer's appointee
resigned. The insurer then appointed B as appraiser, but the insured
thereupon cut off further consideration of an appraisal and brought suit
to collect. It was held that these matters, having been found by the jury,
constituted "waiver" by the insurer.
The Court set down the following mandate concerning the behavior
of the parties toward the appraisers in connection with their selection of
the umpire:
"It may be conceded that defendant might state to the arbitrator
whom it had appointed any specific fact showing the unfitness of any person
whose selection as an umpire might be contemplated; for instance, that
such person was a member of the plaintiff corporation. But it had no
right to assert its mere will, preference, or disapproval, to control the
choice, in which by the terms and spirit of the contract, neither of the
parties was to have a voice. The agreement contemplated that the two
arbitrators alone should select the umpire in the exercise of their judgment
190. Hall Bros. v. Western Assur. Co., 133 Ala. 637, 32 So. 257 (1901). To
like effect see Read v. State Ins. Co., 103 Iowa 307, 72 N.W. 665 (1897); Con-
tinental Ins. Co. v. Vallandingham, 116 Ky. 287, 76 SAY, 22 (1903); Connecticut
Fire Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 97 Md. 294, 55 Atl. 675 (1903); Fowble v. Phoenix Ins. Co.,
106 Mo. App. 527, 81 S.W. 485 (1904).
191. 48 Minn. 380, 51 N.W. 123 (1892). To like effect see Township of
Munro v. Insurance Co., 237 Mich. 646, 213 N.W. 161 (1927); Govin v. Northwestern
Nat. Ins. Co., 145 Wash. 199, 259 Pac. 387 (1927).
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and discretion, uncontrolled by the interested parties. It was of the very
essence of the agreement that the latter should not choose or reject or
assert their preference or objections. If the defendant, by expressing to
the arbitrator whom it had chosen its disapproval of the selection of
particular persons,-as, by saying that such persons would not act im-
partially,-led him to defer to its will, or so influenced him that by reason
of such interference lie did not agree with his fellow arbitrator in the
selection of an umpire when otherwise he would have done so, the failure
of the proposed arbitration is attributable to the fault of the defendant,
and the plaintiff had the right to pursue its legal remedy by action."'" 2
(Italics by the Court)
In short, the appraisers, once they are appointed, bear independent
authority and responsibility to choose a qualified person as umpire; and
neither party may control or unduly influence them in so doing.
Accordingly, the initial problem as to whether or not the parties may
be chargeable with the conduct of their respective appointees who default
for an unreasonable time to choose a qualified person as an umpire conies
to this: Assuming that the party does not overreach his privileges with
respect to the choice of the umpire by seeking unduly to hinder or influence
the appraisers in making their choice, is such party, notwithstanding,
chargeable with such conduct of its appointee as will put it (insured
or insurer as the case may be) in default under the general obligation to
bring on an early appraisal? In almost all of the cases this question has
been raised with respect to the insurer and its appointee rather than with
respect to the insured and his appointee.
192. It seems clear that less explicit, less commanding and more subtle action
on behalf of the insurer to influence its appointee in the choice of the umpire should
be held equally fatal to its plea of the appraisal provision. Neither party (insurer or
insured) can justify such ex parte tampering with the process of completing the
appraisal board. To seek by such means to determine the appointment of two of the
three members of the board is an endeavor not only to circumvent the terms of the
appraisal provision but also to gain what they party must believe is some significant
advantage in the appraisal. Such endeavor by either party-whether it succeeds or
not-seems reasonably chargeable to such party as a deliberate default in the general
obligation of that party to be diligent and bona fide to accomplish an early, fair,
and impartial appraisal.
In the following cases there were instances of such ex parte endeavors by insured
or insurer to influence the appointment of the umpire. It seems clear that the evidence
of these endeavors alone should he held to constitut irretrievable default of the party
under the appraisal provision. See Iyland v. Millers Nat. Ins. Co., 91 F.2d 735
9th Cir, 1937); rehearing denied, 92 F.2d 462 (9th Cir. 1937); Headley v. Aetna
ns. Co., 202 Ala. 384, 80 So. 466 (1918); Hall Bros. v. Westem Assur. Co., 133 Ala.
637, 32 So 257 (1902); Continental Ins. Co. v. Vallandingham, 116 Ky. 287, 76
S.W. 22 (1903); Caledonian Ins. Co. v. Traub, 83 Md. 524, 35 Atl. 13 (1896);
Provident-Washington Ins. Co. v. Kennington, Ill Miss. 244, 71 So. 378 (1916).
Consult further what appears to have been extraordinary indulgence in behalf of
the insured by overlooking such misconduct on his part to his advantage. WVester-
haver v. German-American Ins. Co., 113 iowa 726, 84 N.W. 717 (1900); also Koyer v.
Detroit Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 2d 336, 70 P.2d 927 (1937).
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In Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Bishop,1'9 decided in 1894, the Supreme
Court of Illinois handed down one of the first express rulings on this
question. Counsel for the insurer emphasized the foregoing established
precept that one who is appointed appraiser shall not act as agent or
partisan for the appointing party. Therefore, it was argued, the insurer
could not be held responsible for any conduct of its appointee which may
have contributed to the stalemate in selecting an umpire.
The Court rejected this argument as follows:
"We are inclined to agree with the counsel for appellant (insurer)
in the contention that a person nominated as an arbitrator ought not to
consider himself as the agent for the person on whose behalf he is
nominated . . . But, while it is true that an arbitrator or appraiser is
not to be regarded as the agent of the party appointing him, simply by
reason of the fact of his appointment, yet an arbitrator or appraiser may
act in such a partial manner, and so manifestly in the interest of the party
appointing him, that it may become a question of fact to be submitted
to the jury, or to be determined by the court sitting without a jury, whether
he conducts himself as an agent to such an extent that the party appointing
him shall be held responsible for his acts. If an insurance company selects
a man for appraiser, who, instead of acting as such, conducts himself in
the interest of the company, and as an agent for the company, the company
will be held responsible for such conduct on his part as inures to the benefit
of the company. If the evidence proves that he prevents an agreement,
or the appointment of an umpire, by methods which show him to be the
agent of the company, his acts will be regarded as those of his principal!' '
(Italics supplied)
By this rationale, the insurer's appointee may, by his unilateral action
in dereliction of his office, make himself the "agent" or "partisan" of the
insurer and thereby impute to the insurer enough responsibility for his
actions and delays to work a "waiver." The legal make-up of the "waiver"
in these cases has consisted chiefly of varying items of evidence on the
conduct of the insurer's appointee in the selection of the umpire which
the court would add up to being "arbitrary," "unfair," or as unduly pro-
193. 154 Ill. 9, 39 N.E. 1102 (1894). See also Slepski v. German Fire Ins.
Co., 141 II1. App. 614 (1908); Kavli v. Eagles Star ins. Co., 206 Minn. 360, 288
N.W. 723 (1939).
194. See further, Read v. State Fire Ins. Co., 103 Iowa 307, 72 N.W. 665
(1897); Fowble v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 106 Mo. App. 527, 81 SAY. 485 (19041;
Corp. v. Queen Ins. Co., 104 Mo. App. 502, 79 S.W. 757 (1904); Hickerson v.
Insurance Co., 96 Tenn. 193, 33 SAY. 1041 (1895). Compare Bishop v. Agricultural
Ins. Co., 130 N.Y. 488, 29 N. E. 844 (1892) with Silver v. Western Assur. Co.,
164 N.Y. 381, 58 N.E. 284 (1900).
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crastinating under the insurer's general obligation to accomplish an early
appraisal. 1 5
Under this agency rationale the scope of the trial on the issue of
waiver, the attention of the trial court in its instructions and the verdict
of the jury are centered upon the course of conduct of the insurer's
appointee and whether or not it shall count against the insurer as "waiver."
In some of these cases it appears that the insurer or its agent had knowledge
of what the respective appointees were doing and seeking to do about the
appointment of an umpire, but that they took no steps, or indeed refused
to take any steps, to substitute another as an appraiser. It is doubted,
however, that the "agency" under consideration is intended to be dependent
upon evidence of knowledge or authorization by the insurer.1 ,
The foregoing agency doctrine has been disowned, at least formally,
in more jurisdictions than appear to espouse it. The Supreme Court of
Maryland, in Connecticut Fire Ins. Co. v. Cohen"" was among the first,
if not the first, of the courts expressly to reject it.
"It is fundamental," said the Court, "to the conception of such an
appraisement, which is in effect an arbitration, that the person selected
to make it should be free from the control or direction of the respective
parties whose interests have been confided to them and should act inde-
pendently and upon their own judgment, It being thus the duty of the
parties to the submission to abstain from all interference with the appraisers
195. Insistence by the appraiser upon the appointment of one who is not "dis-
interested" seems to be clearly within these categories of proscribed conduct. See
Hyland v. Millers Nat. Ins. Co., 91 F.2d. 35 (9th Cir. 1937), rehearing denied,
92 F.2d 462 (9th Cir. 1937); Bishop v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 130 N.Y. 488, 29 N.E.
844 (1892).
196. The Supreme Court of Minnesota once indicated that some authorization
from the party may be required. It did so in O'Rourke v. German Ins. Co., 96 Minn.
154, 104 N.W. 900 (1905). After reviewing evidence of the conduct of the insurer's
appointee in refusing to agree upon anyone for umpire except one of two persons whom
he named, and concluding that his conduct was arbitrary and unfair, the Court covered
the question of authorization by observing that "if his [the appraiser's] action was
authorized or approved, directly or indirectly, by the defendant, it would constitute
a waiver of its rights to have the loss adjusted by referees. What the effect would
be upon the rights of the parties if the insurer should affirmatively show that the refusal
of its referee to act was without its knowledge or consent we need not determine.
"But if the defendant did not so authorize or approve such action on the part of
its referee, yet if, upon being advised thereof, it refused to agree to the selection of other
referees, it would thereby waive its rights to an appraisal of the loss." (Italics supplied)
On a later appeal in this case the Court declared that "no direct evidence of
authorization or ratification is required," 99 Minn. 293, 109 N.W. 401 (1906). '[he
Court cited a substantial number of cases as being in accord, including the Niagara
Fire Ins. Co. v. Bishop, supra note 193.
It seems clear enough from the report of Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Bishop, supra
note 193, as decided by the Supreme Court of Illinois, that insurer's appointee took
and expressed a solicitous and partisan interest in behalf of the insurer. But it does
not appear to have been of concern to the Court in making the "agency" which it
did, whether or not the insurer had authorized, approved or had knowledge of the
conduct of its appointee with respect to the selection of the umpire.
197. 97 Md. 294, 55 Atl, 675 (1903). The Court expressly relied upon parts
of its opinion in the earlier case of Caledonian Ins. Co. v. Traub, 83 Md. 524, 35 Atl.
13 (1896).
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it would be manifestly unjust, when they have observed such abstinence,
to hold then responsible for the negligence or misconduct of the appraisers.
In order to defeat the rights of a party to a submission to an appraisement
by reason of the conduct of the appraiser the evidence should connect the
party himself with that conduct." (Italics supplied).1'0 7a
By taking this position the court redirected the inquiry in such cases.
It redirected the inquiry from search for fault of the insurer, or of its
appointee, for the impasse of the appraisers in choosing an umpire, to the
more negative inquiry, namely, the insured's freedom from fault therefor.
Default of insured's appointee as appraiser is not to be counted unless it
is made to appear that the insured himself induced or abetted it.
The Court reaffirmed its foregoing views in Shawnee Ins. Co. v. Pont-
field.' 8 In this case, the insurer sought to bring fault home to the insured
himself for the failure of the appraisal by claiming that he broke up the
pending endeavor of the appraisers to select an umpire by bringing his action
to collect on the policy.
On this point the Court took the position that the inquiry should
first be centered upon whether or not there was "any evidence in the case
tending to show that before the suit was brought the submission to appraise-
ment had failed." If the jury should find that the appraisers came to the
impasse in choosing an umpire before the action was instituted, and after
they had had "a fair opportunity, and a reasonable time in which to make
the appraisement," and this "without any fault of the insured," the insured
can sue.199
197a. Connecticut Fire Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 97 Md. 294, 300.1, 55 Atl. 675,
677 (1903).
198. 110 Md. 353, 72 Atl. 835 (1909).
199. The foregoing views of the Maryland Court both in narrowing the question
of the insurer's waiver (insured's excuse) to that of fault or not fault of the insured
himself and in disclaiming the agency rationale appear to be accepted in the
following cases:
U.S. Norwich Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Cohn, 68 F.2d 42 (10th Cir. 1933) (appraisal
broke down after umpire had been appointed; appraisal started; adjournment; umpire
resigned); Western Assur. Co. v. Decker, 98 Fed. 381 (8th Cir. 1899).
Ala. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Mansfield, 225 Ala, 449, 143 So. 465 (1932) (decision
on demurrer to insurer's plea); Headley v. Aetna Ins. Co., 202 Ala. 384, 80 So. 466 (1918).
Ca. See Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. v. Jewell Co., 36 Ga. App. 538, 137 S.E.
286 (1927).
Kan. See Cowles v. Connecticut Fire Ins. Co. 113 Kan. 532, 215 Pac. 308 (1923);
Jerrils v. German American Ins. Co., 82 Kan. 320, 108 Pac. 114 (1910).
Ill. Lancashire Ins. Co. v. Lyon, 124 Ill. App. 491 (1906); compare Niagara Fire Ins.
Co. v. Bishop, 154 Ill. 9, 39 N.E. 1102 (1894).
Ind. See Vernon Ins. Co. v. Maitlin, 158 Ind. 393, 63 N.E. 755 (1902).
Miss. Provident-Washington Ins. Co. v. Kennington, Ill Miss. 244, 71 So. 378 (1916).
Mo. See Security Printing Co. v. Connecticut Fire Ins. Co., 209 Mo. App. 422, 240
S.W. 263 (1922); Sharp v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 164 Mo. App. 475, 147 S.W. 154
(1912); but see Fowble v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 106 Mo. App. 527, 81 S.W. 485 (1904);
Carp v. Queen Ins. Co., 104 Mo. App. 502, 79 S.W. 757 (1904).
N. C. See Pretzfelder v. Merchants' Ins. Co., 123 N.C. 16, 31 S.E. 470 (1898). The
question submitted to the jury-and approved on appeal-was this: "Was the failure
of the appraisers to make an award caused by the plaintiffs or any of them?" (Italics
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It is concluded that under these views as advanced by the Maryland
Court, the making of waiver against the insurer is somewhat easier for
the insured than under the view directing inquiry to the fault of the insurer,
or of its appointee as its agent.
200
Under the Maryland view the issue of waiver (excuse of insured) is
narrowed to three questions about as follows: (1) Is there "any evidence
tending to show that before suit was brought the submission to appraise-
ment had failed"? (2) Did the appraisers have "fair opportunity and a
reasonable time" in which to choose an umpire before the insured withdrew
from appraisal and started his action? (3) Did the insured induce the
failure of the appraisers to choose an umpire? Whether or not the insurer
or its appraiser were at fault for the impasse accruing between the appraisers
and whether or npt insurer's appointee is its agent is not important to
this instance of "waiver"; and the course of conduct of the insured's appointee
becomes important only when it is connected to the insured; the inquiry
centers upon the question of fault of the insuired himself and this generally
requires evidence of his inducement of his appointee's default.
The Maryland Court also indicated that it might be inclined to rule
out any agency as between the insurer and its appointee as appraiser as
much as between insured and his appointee. On the other hand, it regarded
the lot of the insured and of the insurer as being different in these cases.
(What might be the results of ruling out the agency of the insurer's
appointee are not apparent). Said the Court in the Cohen case:
"It is in our judgment sufficient to maintain the right of the insured
to sue in such cases, to find that the failure of the appraisement was without
fault on his part, and it is unnecessary for that purpose to ascertain that
supplied). Said the Court: "When this cause was here on the former appeal it was
held that, if the appraisal fell through by no fault of the plaintiff, he is relegated to
his right of action." Compare Braddy v. New York Bowery Fire Ins. Co., 115 N.C.
354 20 S.E. 477 (1894).
R. 1. See Messler v. Williamsburgh City Fire Ins. Co., 94 Ati. 875 (R1l. 1915).
Tenn. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 129 Tenn. 55, 164 S.W.
1186 (1914); compare Hickerson v. Insurance Cos. 96 '[enn. 193, 33 S.W. 1041 (1895).
V. Va. Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Drake, 170 W. Va. 257, 196 S.E. 664 (1938). It is
indicated in the Kansas case of Cowles v. Connecticut Fire Ins. Co. infra note 202
that "the burden" is on the insured 'to prove that before bringing the action she
appointed or caused to be appointed an appraiser in good faith, and that an appraisement
failed without fault on her part; and further that if she did not show good faith and
freedom from fault in this respect, the verdict vnust be for defendants." (Italics supplied).
It is doubted that this "burden" with respect to the matters italicized is more than
formal unless and until there is substantial evidence from the insurer connecting the
insured himself with the conduct of the appraiser appointed by him. See the earlier
Kansas case, Jerrils v. German American Ins. Co., supra.
200. When the scope of inquiry is directed to the fault of the insurer as imputed
to it from the fault of its appointee, a comparative judgment involving the reative
fault of the two appraisers may seem plausible. See, e.g., Carp v. Queen Ins. Co.
104 Mo. App. 502, 79 S.W. 757 (1904); American Central Ins. Co. v. Terry, 298
S.W. 658 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927). Consult further, Vernon Ins. Co. v. Maitlen, 158
Ind. 393, 63 N.E. 755 (1902). More generally, however, the conduct of the insured's
appraiser is not put to such judgment in making up the fault of the insurer. See, e.g.,
Biship v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 130 N.Y. 488, 29 N.E. 844 (1892).
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the insurer was the cause of the failure. The title of the insured to maintain
his suit rests upon his policy and not upon the conduct of the insurer in
relation to the appraisement. He may, when the policy provides for an
appraisement, be estopped from bringing his suit by his own conduct in
reference to the appraisement, but if his conduct in that connection be
free from fault he is not estopped from suing by the failure of the appraise-
ment from other causes." (Italics supplied)
20 a
In the Shawnee Ins. Co. case supra, the Court expressed the opinion
that if "no award is obtained by reason of the fault of the appraiser selected
by the insurer, the insured has a right to sue, not because the appraiser so
in fault is the agent of the insurer, but because the means provided by
the contract of ascertaining the loss failed without any fault on the part of
the insured."20
0b
While the fact-situations making up the failure of the appraisers to
agree upon an umpire vary in the cases, there is one situation that
recurringly has led to the impasse. It has occurred in a substantial group
of cases and has been resolved under both of the foregoing general views
of the courts-i.e. undE the inquiry as to the fault-of-the-insurer-through-
its-appraiser and under the no-fault-of-the-insurcd-himself inquiry. Thus, the
appraisers have come to a more or less definitive deadlock by the time
the insured starts suit. The insured's appointee insists upon a person as
umpire who resides at or near the place of the fire (some one "living
in the vicinage," or at the "locality of the fire") while the insurer's
appointee insists upon a person living at a distance from the fire or who
is a non-resident of the state.20 ' This point of difference is constant; there
is, however, a variety of attending circulnstances. But those circumstances,
tend to conform to a general pattern or outline about as follows: Insurer's
appointee nominates several persons for umpire who reside at a substantial
distance from the locale of the fire; they may or may not be non-residents
of the state. Insured's appointee nominates persons residing at or near
the place of the loss. Sometimes the respective appraisers refuse the other's
nominations expressly on the ground that they come from too far away
or are too local, as the case may be; sometimes their reasons, as reported
to each other, are less explicit. Almost never is the challege based upon
any ground of disqualification stated in the appraisal provision. Varying
degrees of abruptness and obstinacy o] the part of both appointees appear
in the different cases; overtures from one to the other to get on with the
appointment appear in some of them. In some cases the situation appears
to be still fluid while in others the impasse appears to be more definitive
and final when the insured commences his suit to collect on the policy.
200a. Connecticut Fire Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 97 Md. 294, 303-4, 55 At]. 675,
678 (1903).
200b. Shawnee Ins. Co. v. Pontfield, 110 Md. 353, 361, 72 At]. 835 836 (1909).
201. That appraisal provisions under some standard policy legislation prescribe that
the appraisal board shall be composed of residents.
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
The decisions are nearly uniform with respect to this point of dis-
agreement of the appraisers (and regardless of the foregoing variations of
the attending circumstances) and hold (1) that insistence by the insured's
appointee upon a local person is justified and (2) that the action of the
insurer's appointee in refusing to join in the appointment of such person
is "arbitrary" and "unreasonable." Accordingly, an unreasonable time having
been used up in this bickering, the insurer's plea of the appraisal provision
fails.
202
The insured seems to have somewhat the better argument in these
cases. If the nominee for umpire is otherwise "competent and disinterested"
it is not clear why it is important to the insurer (or to its appointee) that
the umpire come from a distance or that he not be a local man. Generally
he will engage in the appraisal at the place of the fire and it is not clear
what his distant residence can legitimately contribute to his immunity
from "local influence," or in fortifying his competence and disinterestedness
in the course of the appraisal.203
In supporting the insured's side of this question it also is deemed
worthy of note that, by the terms of the appraisal provision, the insured
202. Ala. Headley v. Aetna Ins. Co. 202 Ala. 384, 80 So. 466 (1918).
111. Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Bishop, 154 II. 9, 39 N.E. 1102 (1894).
Iowa. Consult Westenhaver v. German-American Ins. Co., 113 Iowa 726, 84 N.W.
717 (1900); Harrison v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 112 Iowa 77, 83 NAy. 820 (1900).
Kan. Cowles v. Connecticut Fire Ins. Co., 113 Kan. 532, 215 Pac. 308 (1923).
Maine. See Young v. Aetna Ins. Co., 101 Me. 294, 64 AtI. 584 (1906).
Md. Shawnee Ins. Co. v. Pontfield, 110 Md. 353, 72 Atl, 835 (1909).
Mich. Township of Munroe v. Insurance Co., 237 Mich. 646, 213 N.W. 161 (1927);
Brock v. Dwelling House Ins. Co., 102 Mich. 583, 61 N.W. 67 (1894). But see
Kersey v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 135 Mich. 10, 97 N.W. 57 (1903). In the Kersey case
the Court summarized the situation as follows: "Ihe evidence shows this, and only
this: that defendant's arbitrator declined to accept as umpire any of the dozen or fifteen
business men of Reed City suggested by plaintiff's arbitrator, and that most of the
persons proposed by him lived out of town, and were for that reason rejected by
plaintiff's arbitrator, and that an umpire willing to act was never selected. There was
no evidence that the men proposed as umpire by defendant's arbitrator were not fair
and competent men; nor was there any evidence that there was not a valid, bona fide
objection to those proposed by plaintiff's arbitrator. We cannot, therefore, hold
defendant responsible for the failure to select an umpire." (italics supplied) Consult
further, Baumgarten v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 152 Mich. 479, 116 N.W. 449 (1908).
It must be recognized that the foregoing language in the Kersey case in italics
is new and strange doctrine in these cases involving the pursuit of waiver of the
appraisal provision; and this approach cuts across that of the Court in the Brock
case. The Brock case, although widely cited with approval by other courts, was not
mentioned in this case.
Mo. McCullough v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 113 Mo. 606, 21 S.W. 207 (1892); Mason
v. Fidelity Phoenix Ins. Co. 258 S.W. 759 (Mo. App. 1924); Fowble v. Phoenix Ins.
Co., 106 Mo. App. 527, 81 S.W. 485 (1904); see also, Carp v. Queen Ins.
Co., 104 Mo. App. 502, 79 S.W. 757 (1904).
N. C. Braddy v. New York Bowery Fire Ins. Co., 115 N.C. 354, 20 S.E. 427 (1894).
Tenn. Hickerson & Co. v. Insurance Cos., 96 Tenn. 193, 33 SW. 1041 (1895).
Texas. New York Underwriters' Ins. Co. v. Sproles, 73 S.V. 2d 857 (Tex. Civ. App.,
1934),(policy concerning wind damage).
Wis. Chapman v. Rockford Ins. Co., 89 Wis. 572, 62 N.W. 422 (1895).
203. On the other hand the suggestion that one from the home folk "would naturally
be best qualified to pass upon the question of values" as made in Brock v. Dwelling
House Ins. Co., supra note 202, seems quite doubtful.
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shares equally with the insurer the expenses of the umpire. The greater
the distance to be covered by the umpire, the greater, of course, will be
his expenses. It also seems probable that, with a local umpire, there may
be greater facility in convening the appraisal board for the appraisal.
It is pointed out above that modern standard policy legislation indicates
a purpose to cxpedite the completion of the appraisal board by fixing time
schedules for the selection of appraisers. If the time schedules are not
met, the insured may sue to collect on the policy. There is no corresponding
time limitation for appointing an umpire. But there is provision for a
somewhat more affirmative enforcement of the appraisal provision to meet
the situation when the appraisers fail to choose an umpire. It may be
invoked after a stated length of time following such failure by the
appraisers. Either party may apply, under some statutes to a judge, and
under others, to the Insurance Commissioner, to appoint an umpire when
the appraisers fail to do so.
20 4
Under the New York standard policy legislation the appraisers, having
been duly selected, "shall first select a competent and disinterested umpire,"
and, upon their "failing for fifteen days to agree upon such umpire," either
party may apply to a judge of a court of record to make the appointment.20,
Maine and Massachusetts200 provide that if the two referees selected by
the parties in the manner prescribed by the statute shall fail to agree
upon and select a third referee 00a within ten days from their appointment207
then either of the parties2 0r may apply to the Insurance Commissioner to
appoint such third referee.
Under the Minnesota legislation the two appraisers chosen by the
parties "shall first select" a qualified person as umpire, "provided, that
if after five days the two appraisers cannot agree on such an umpire," then
either party may apply in writing on five days notice thereof to the judge
of a designated court to make the appointment.20s
In the foregoing cases making "waiver" against the insurer out of
failure of the appraisers to choose an umpire by the time suit is started
204. Concerning various questions relating to the use of these procedures to enforce
these appraisal provisions by appointment of the umpire, see infra § 8, "Enforcement
of Appraisal Provisions."
205. N.Y. Ins. LAw § 168 (1949).
206. MAINE REv. STATS. ANN. c. 60, § 108 (1954); MAss. GEN. LAws, c. 175,
§ 100 (1932).
206a. Maine adds "willing to act in said capacity," and Massachusetts provides in a
separate section that "Every person nominated, specified or appointed" shall be "willing
to act as referee." id. § I00B.
207. Massachusetts dates the ten days "from the choice of the second referee."
MASS. ANN. LAws, c. 175, § 100 (1932).
207a. Massachusetts provides that "either of the said referees [selected by the
parties] or Parties" may apply to the Commissioner to appoint the third referee. (Italics
added).
208. MINN. STAT. § 65.01 (1953). When the five dsys begins to run is not very clear.
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by the insured to collect on the policy, no consideration appears to have
been given to the above statutory provisions enabling either party to gain
the appointment of an umpire in a summary manner. It seems doubtful,
however, that the courts will allow the availability of this remedy to burden
the make-up of the waiver. By the text of these statutes resort to the
remedy is permissive, not mandatory. Unless the insurer duly invokes the
remedy, it seems reasonable to expect that the courts will allow the insured
to sue to collect on his policy and excuse himself from the appraisal provision
without first pursuing or attempting to follow this further remedy looking
to an appraisal in lieu of litigation.
Miscellaneous defaults in furthering early appraisal-"waiver" by the insurer.
The general obligation of tile insurer under the appraisal provision to do
its part in accomplishing an early appraisal has been applied in a variety
of situations beyond those involving the establishment and maintenance
of the appraisal board. While the cases involving these situations are
fewer in number than those relating to the organization of thc board, the
likelihood of the situations occurring is deemed sufficient to justify mention
of at least some of them.
Thus, on occasion, the parties have informally agreed upon appraisal,
but they have fallen into disagreement over the terms of a proposed formal
submission agreement.209  Even though it was found that "both parties
were acting in good faith" in presenting and standing upon their opposing
claims as to what the submission should provide, it has been held that the
reasonable time limitation for bringing on the appraisal will expire not-
withstanding, and thereby work "waiver" against the insurer. The insurer
may not indulge in such disagreement indefinitely.210
It also is clear that insistence by the insurer for too long upon a
submission agreement relating to the appraisal which does not conform in
its terms to those of the appraisal provision is competent and sufficient
evidence of "waiver." Neither party may require more or less in the
submission agreement than is provided in the appraisal provision.
21'
209. It seems clear that no submission agreement is necessary. Pennsylvania Lumber-
mans Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Barfield, 138 F.2d 365 (3rd Cir. 1943). Consult further,
Bucholz v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 265 App. Div. 467, 39 N.Y.S.2d 663 (1st Dep't 1943)
aff'd. 293 N.Y. 82, 56 N.E.2d 43 (1944).
210. National Fire Ins. Co. v. Pinnell, 199 Ky. 624, 251 S.W. 651 (1923).
See also, Dee & Sons v. Key City Fire Ins. Co., 104 Iowa 167, 73 N.W. 594 (1897)
(insured claimed that insurance covered items of property not listed in policy; insured
enied liability for any items not so listed); Walker v. Ins. Co., 51 Kan. 725, 33 Pac.
597 (1893); Fidelity Phenix Fire Ins. Co. v. Itenry, 248 Ky. 818, 60 S.W.2d 111 (1933).
211. See Dee & Sons v. Key City Fire Ins. Co. supra note 210; Walker v. Insurance
Co., supra note 210. Nor may the insured validly claim such non-conforming submission;
insurer's refusal of such claim held, no waiver. Pennsylvania Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Barfield, 138 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1943).
There is, moreover, some judicial opinion indicating that when the parties agree
upon a submission which does not conform to the terms of the appraisal provision
and the appraisal or award thereunder fails, the insurer may not thereafter claim
appraisal pursuant to the appraisal provision. Davis v. Atlas Assur. Co., 16 Wash. 232,
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In another case the making and revocation by the insurer of appoint-
ments of a succession of persons as appraiser appeared along with some
indication of purpose by the insurer thereby to play fast and loose with
the appraisal and pressure a settlement. Such evidence was held competent
and sufficient to establish insurer's default under the appraisal provision.2 12
Another situation may be summarized as follows: Due progress has
been made in setting up the appraisal board pursuant to the appraisal
provision and the time and place for starting the appraisal agreed upon.
But the insurer's appointee as appraiser fails to appear. The insured, his
appointee and the umpire appear at the time and place as agreed. Insured
is incurring expenses on account of his appointee and of the umpire. No
explanation for the absence of the insurer's appointee is forthcoming. Quite
clearly such situation can soon be counted as sufficient evidence of default
and waiver by the insurer. In a case of this sort the Supreme Court of
Indiana declared as follows:
"When the agreement to submit to appraisal was executed by the
parties, and appellant [the insurer] learned that the appraiser selected by
it could not be present at the time fixed to commence the appraisal, it
was the duty of appellant, within a reasonable time, to select another
appraiser who would proceed without unnecessary delay, to the perform-
ance of his duties. The right of appellant to have an appraisal under the
agreement therefor was not indefinite as to time, but such appraisal must
be completed within a reasonable time, and what was such reasonable
time depends upon the facts of the case, and was a question for the jury
to determine. ' 21
3
Same-If a First Appraisal Fails, Does the Appraisal Provision Survive-
Are the Parties To Try Again?
The topic question presupposes not only failure of the parties to
agree upon the amount of loss and damage but also that they have taken
some steps to bring on an appraisal. Most of the cases in which the
question has been answered are of a common pattern. Thuns, each party
duly appoints a qualified person as appraiser. The appraisal comes to
47 Pac. 436 (1896); Compare Davis v. Imperial Ins. Co., 16 Wash. 241, 47 Pac. 439
(1896). In Adams v. New York Bowery Fire Ins. Co., 85 Iowa 6, 51 N.A. 1149 (1892),
the Court observed as follows: "By entering into an agreement of submission not in accord
with the provisions of the policy, and standing on the validity of an award made under
such submission, defendant [insurer] must be held to have waived the right (if he
had any), to insist that an award must be made in accordance with the terms of the
policy before suit could be commenced thereon." (The submission in the Adams case
restricted the appraisal to items not wholly destroyed. The award was limited accordingly.
An appraisal and award under the terms of the appraisal provision would not have
been so restricted). Compare Vincent v. German Ins. Co., 120 Iowa 272, 94
N.W. 458 (1903).
212. Talbert v. Northwestern Nat. Ins. Co., 167 La. 608, 120 So. 24 (1929).
213. Providence-Washington Ins. Co. v. Wolf, 168 Ind. 690, 80 N.E. 26,
(1907). See also, Harrison v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. -. Iowa.._, 80 N.W. 309 (1899);
Harrison v. German-American Ins. Co., 67 Fed. 577 (S.D. Iowa 1895).
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naught by reason of an impasse developing thereafter within the appraisal
board so that no award is rendered, or the appraisal goes to award, but
is ruled invalid. When the appraisal fails in either of these situations, does
the appraisal provision survive and require the parties to try again?
'1his question arises for decision whether, as under the more prevalent
view, the insurer must first duly demand appraisal to make the provision
effective, or, as under the more limited view, the insured must take the
initiative and offer appraisal.
214
It also will be noted that this general question does not come before
the courts in any direct proceeding between its parties to enforce a futlther
appraisal. Generally no such remedy is available to enforce the appraisal
provision.215 Instead, it is presented for judicial consideration in the action
brought by the insured to collect on the policy. It is presented under
somewhat different circumstances when the appraisal proves abortive before
award from those obtaining when the appraisal has gone to award. In
the latter situation the determination of the invalidity of the award and
allied matters become involved in the action as well as the consideration
and disposition of the question at hand. These additional considerations
are cited below.
A majority of the decisions passing on the question have ruled with
respect to both situations that the appraisal provision does not survive the
first failure so as to require any further attempt at an appraisal and award.210
In arriving at this majority view some of the courts have pointed
out that the text of the appraisal provision does not stipulate for any
second attempt.2 17 It neither requires nor excuses one; it is silent on the
point. Also, the query has been voiced as to what-might-bc-the-end-of-it-all
if the provision were held to require a second attempt; if the second were
to fail, might a third be required, and so on indefinitely, or ad infinitum?
218
When the first attempt fails before award. When the first endeavor
ends in an impasse before any award is rendered the question at hand
214. See sup ra § 6, Irrevocable Appraisal Provisions--How Invoked, 11 MInuII
L.Q. 35.
215. See infra, § 8, "Enforcement of Appraisal Provisions."
216. Cases on the general question are collected and reviewed in an Annotation,
94 A.L.R. 494.
217. See, for example, Headley v. Aetna Ins. Co., 202 Ala. 384, 80 So. 466 (1918).
'Ihe Supreme Court of Mississippi observed on the point as follows: "The policy
does not contain an express provision for an appraisement in the event the appraisers
first selected fail to agree; and this provision of the policy being one of the many
printed provisions prepared by the insurance company and for its benefit, should not
be enlarged or extended by any construction of this court." Provident-Washington Ins.
Co. v. Kennington, 111 Miss. 244, 71 So. 378 (1916).
218. Norwich Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 68 Fed. 42 (10th Cir. 1933); Provident-
Washington Ins. Co. v. Kennington, 111 Miss. 244, 71 So. 378 (1916). Consult
also Fire Ass'n Phila. v. Appel, 76 Ohio St. 1, 80 N. E. 952 (1907).
No case has been observed in which more than the first failure and second attempt
were involved.
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is resolved, as indicated above, in the insured's action to collect on the
policy. The insurer will have pleaded the appraisal provision. The insured
will rely upon the impasse which intervened to excuse his further com-
pliance with the appraisal provision.
The parties will have progressed to the extent that each party has
appointed a qualified person as appraiser. The two appraisers may have
tried and failed to agree upon an award; they may have tried and failed
to choose an umpire, they may have agreed upon an umpire but he may
have refused to act, or he may have accepted and then resigned before
any award was reached; or the appraisers and umpire may have started on
their appraisal work, have adjourned before it was completed, and have
tried without success to reconvene and complete the appraisal. At some
point along the line the insured will have cut short further participation by
his appointee and have commenced his action to collect on the policy.
It is noticeable that in most of these cases the courts have been
disposed, in stating their rulings, to allocate "the fault" for the failure
to one, or both, of the parties, or to acquit both. The identity of "the
fault" is not always clear.
The instances of potential fault of the respective parties in these cases
appear to be as follows: (1) The insured withdraws from the appraisal
and brings his action prematurely; he still owes time and effort under the
appraisal provision.219 (2) The insurer defaults under its near absolute
responsibility to bring on an early appraisal and award as advanced in
Uhrig v. Williamsburg City Fire Ins. Co. reviewed above p. 343. (3) The
party dictates to the appraisers, or one of them, who should be, or should
not be, the umpire, thereby contributing to or bringing about the impasse
over his selection; or the party may otherwise induce the given stalemate
of the appraisers in their proceedings.
220
It remains to note that in most of the cases concerned with the
general question at hand the rulings have been predicated upon the declared
conclusion that both parties were without "fault" for the failure of the first
appraisal. This predication for these rulings appears to rest upon a record
in each case which is negative of substantial evidence of the foregoing
instances of fault on the part of either party, or upon the disposition
of the court in the given case so to characterize the record in order to
219. See Silver v. Western Assur. Co., 164 N.Y. 381, 58 N.E. 284 (1900);
Williams v. German Ins. Co., 90 App. Div. 413, 86 N.Y.S. 98 (4th Dep't 1904).
Compare Shawnee Ins. Co. v. Poutfield, 110 Md. 353, 72 At]. 835 (1909)
220. See Caledonian Ins. Co. v. Traub, 83 Md. 524, 35 Atl. 13 (1896); Reflley
v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 311 II1. App. 562, 37 NE.2d 352 (1941).
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"rescue" the insured from the appraisal provision and the postponement
of his action to collect on the policy.
22'
It remains to observe further that the allocation of "the fault" in
these cases appears to be of little consequence provided the net conclusion
is that the insured is not at fault. If "thc fault" is not his, it is not im-
portant whether or not it is that of the insurer. Rare indeed are the
cases in which the insured has been determined by judgment or verdict
to be at fault for the failure of the first appraisal. This is not surprising
since such adjudication, if followed to its bitter end, could be made to
mean that the insured cannot gain further apraisal, nor can he maintain
any action to collect any loss bn his policy.
222
The Supreme Court of California seems to be alone in the view that
when both appraisers share "the fault," the appraiser for the insured is not
so at fault but that the insured may sue without appraisal.
223
The insured being "without fault" for the failure of the first appraisal,
the general question at hand may be broken down as follows: Shall the
insured be allowed to maintain his action to collect on the policy without
first offering to start over on another appraisal, or without requesting the
insurer to join with him in so doing? Shall he be allowed to maintain
his action if the insurer shall have offered and requested that they start
over, but the insured shall have refused?
The view of the majority of the courts in the cases appears to be as
follows: Once the insured has duly selected a qualified person as appraiser,
and he, in turn, has undertaken to serve as such and to bring on the
appraisal and the proceedings come to an impasse without fault of the
insured, the insured may cancel his further participation in the appraisal
and commence his action without any offer or request that the parties
start over by appointing new appraisers or otherwise. Nor is he required
to respond to the insurer's request that they do so.
Thus, in one of the earliest American cases on this question, Western
Assur. Co. v .Decker,2 2 4 it is reportcd that the two appraisers were unable
to agree upon an award or upon an umpire and that they "finally abandoned
all effort to agree on either." Neither party offered to appoint or requested
221. See, for example, Koger v. Detroit Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 9 Cal.2d 336,
70 P.Zd 927 (1937); Westenhaver v. German-American Ins. Co., 113 Iowa 726,
82 N.W. 717 (1900). Compare, Reilley v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 311 Ill. App. 562,
37 N.E.2d 352 (1941); American Central Ins. Co. v. Terry, 298 S.W. 258 ('Vex. Cir.App. 1927).222. See Reilley v. Agricultural Ins. Co., supra note 221.
223. Koger v. Detroit Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 9 Cal.2d 336, 70 P.2d 927 (1937)
(certain provisions of the standard policy legislation then in effect were considered in
deriving this quite abstruse consequence). See further, Westenhaver v. German-American
Ins. Co., 113 Iowa 726, 82 N.W. 717 (1900) wherein like judicial labors were diverted
to the insured's cause. Compare American Central Ins. Co. v. Terry, 298 S.WV 658 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1927).
224. 98 Fed. 381 (8th Cir. 1899).
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the other to appoint, a substitute appraiser. The insured thereafter sued
to collect on the policy. The insurer, in support of its plea of the appraisal
provision, urged that the insured should have proposed a new selection of
appraisers and that, "not having done so, and not having appointed all
arbitrator the second tilnc, he cannot maintain this action." Ruling against
the insurer the Court said:
"The terms of the policy are satisfied when the insured, acting in good
faith, appoints an appraiser. If the appraisement falls through by dis-
agreement of the appraisers without any fault of the insured,, he has
discharged his covenant, and satisfied the requirements of the policy, and
may then resort to the courts to have his damages assessed."
And with specific reference to the point that the insured had made
no offer to participate in the selection of new appraisers the Court continued:
"Even if a second appointment of arbitrators was required by the
terms of the policy, there is nothing in the policy, as contended by the
defendant in error, which imposes on the insured the obligation to be the
first to propose another selection of arbitrators and appoint a second
arbitrator."
2 2 ,
225. The Court took this position in the face of a dissenting opinion by Sanborn, J.
The dissent made the point that the appraisal provision was unconditional in its terms,
that is, it was not the more common one wherein appraisal is provided upon written
request by either party. Being thus an unconditional condition precedent, it was urged
that the insured must "show that he has done everything on his part that could be
done" to obtain an appraisal and award. By reason of this requirement Sanborn, J.,
observed as follows:
"In my opinion, the mere appointment of an appraiser who could not or would
not agree with his associate upon an umpire, and whose disagreement necessarily prevented
the appraisal and award, fell far short of a compliance with this rule. The insured
might have revoked his appointment, and have appointed another appraiser. lie might
have caused his appraiser to propose a number of unexceptionable men as umpires,
and to request the appraiser of the company to choose from them. lie might have
caused his appraiser to request his associates to propose such men, and permit him
to choose. lie might have requested the insurer to agree with him upon other appraisers.
These are but the ordinary means to choose an umpire which would occur at once
to every one who really sought to secure a choice, and I am unable to believe that,
without resorting to any of them, or taking any action to procure the appraisal other
than the appointment of an inactive appraiser, the insured has done all that he could
do to bring about the appraisal and award."
Iu accord with the majority of the Court in the Decker case:
U.S. See Spring Garden Ins. Co. v. Amusement Syndicate Co., 178 Fed. 519 (8th
Cir. 1910).
Ala. tleadley v. Aetna Ins. Co., 202 Ala. 384, 80 So. 466 (1918) (policy covering
tornado and cyclone loss).
Ill. Niagara Fire Ins. Co, v. Bishop, 154 I11. 9, 39 N.E. 1102 (1894).
Miss. Providen-Washington Ins. Co. v. Kennington, 111 Miss. 244, 71 So. 378 (1916).
Consult also Uhrig v. Williamsburg City Fire Ins. Co., 101 N.Y. 362, 4 N.E. 475
(1886)(the two appraisers failed to agree upon an umpire; there was evidence that
insured requested insurer to appoint another appraiser or have its appointee agree with
insurer's appointee upon an umpire and that insurer refused. The Court appears to
have considered this refusal as a "refusal or neglect to go on with the first arbitration,"
and therefore the insurer's subsequent request for appraisal was misconceived. By
its refusal the insurer put itself at fault for the failure. And: "The plaintiff having once
consented to arbitrate, if the arbitration failed and came to an end, from the fault
of the defendant, the arbitration clause could not stand in the way of this action."
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In N onvich Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Cohen.2 -'" the appraisal had pro-
gressed further than in the foregoing Decker case as follows: Each party had
named an appraiser: the appraisers had agreed upon an umpire; the board
commenced the appraisal; before the appraisal was completed an adjourn-
ment was had by general consent, but apparently to no stated date. Efforts
of the three to reconvene had proved abortive and the umpire resigned.
It is further reported that after this situation had developed the appraiser
appointed by the insurer "wrote several letters to the appraiser for the
insured in an effort to fix a date, to which there were no replies in writing,
although there is testimony that the insured's appraiser called the coin-
panies' appraiser on the telephone several times concerning the matter."
Shortly thereafter, as is further reported, adjusters for the companies wrote
plaintiff demanding that a new appraisal agreement be entered into, and
new appraisers appointed. The insured did not reply but started his suit
shortly thereafter. The Court affirmed the trial court's instruction to the
jury that upon the demand by the insurer it became the duty of the
insured to name an appraiser "and if she (the insured]in good faith names
an appraiser and the appraisement fails without her fault she is not required
to propose the selection of other appraisers, nor is she required to name
another appraiser even at the request of the defendant but may resort to
the courts to have her damages assessed." (Italics supplied).
22
226. 68 F.2d 42 (10th Cir. 1933).
227. Accord:
Kan. Cowles v. Connecticut Fire Ins. Co., 113 Kan. 532, 215 Pac. 308 (1923);
Jerrills v. German American Ins. Co., 82 Kan. 320, 108 Pac. 114 (1910)(after the
impasse insurer had offered to appoint a substitute appraiser and suggested that insured
do likewise. Insured did not respond).
N.C. Pretzfelder v. Merchants' Ins. Co., 116 N.C. 491, 21 S.E. 302 (1895)(after the
impasse insured proposed to insurer that the parties appoint new appraisers; insurer
refused unless insurer's original appointee be retained; insured refused; thereafter insurer
proposed appointment of new appraisers; insured refused).
Texas. Bankers' & Shippers' Ins. Co. v. Sharber Grocery Co., 297 S.W. 474 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1927) (after the impassee insurer offered to appoint substitute appraiser and
requested insured to do likewise; insured refused).
Pa. Chavin v. Superior Fire Ins. Co., 283 Pa. 397, 129 Atl. 326 (1925); Fritz v.
British American Ins. Co., 208 Pa. 268, 57 AtI. 573 (1904) (It is not clear that the
uestion whether or not there must be a second try at an appraisal is significant in
ennsylvania in view of the apparent rulings in that state that such appraisal provisions
are revocable from the beginning. See infra 11 MIAMI L.Q. 31.
Va. Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Drake, 170 Va. 257, 196 S.E. 664 (1916).
A Georgia case indicates that the foregoing majority view obtains in case an
impasse over the choice of an umpire, unless the insurer makes "a further demand"
for appraisal. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. v. Jewell-Loudermilk Co., 36 Ca. App.
538, 137 S.E. 286 (1927). Consult also, Messier v. Williamsburgh City Fire Ins. Co.,
42 R.I. 460, 108 Atl. 832 (1920).
The position of the Supreme Court of Connecticut on the general question at hand
is left in doubt in Bernhard v. Rochester German Ins. Co., 79 Conn. 388, 65 Atl.
134 (1906).
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The minority view-Davenport v. Long Island Ins. Co.' 8 The minority
decisions ruling that the appraisal provision survives the failure of an
appraisal before award rendered appear to stern from the Davenport case.
It was decided in 1882 by the then Court of Common Pleas for the City
and County of New York. The appraisal provision became effective upon
the written request of either party. The Court expressed its view that the
guiding rule with respect to the question at hand requires the insured to
"show that he has done everything on his part which could be done" to
carry out the appraisal provision.22- ' Looking to the evidence in the case,
it concluded that "neither the plaintiff nor the defendant were in any way
responsible" for the failure of the two appraisers to agree upon the third.',
Upon this conclusion as to the evidence and in furtherance of the foregoing
guiding rule the Court held that it was the insured's duty "at least to
propose to the defendants that they should each select new appraisers"
before bringing his action to collect on the policy. Accordingly, the insurer's
plea of the appraisal provision prevailed.
23 1
228. 10 Daly 535 (N.Y. 1882). The case has been cited to the Court of Appeals
to sustain the insurer's claim to resunbmission after an award had been held invalid. The
Court denied the claim but did not mention the Davenport case. See Ethel Gervant v.
New England Fire Ins. Co., 306 N.Y. 393, 118 N.E.2d 574 (1954).
229. The Court referred to the ruling of the United States Supreme Court in
United States v. Robeson, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 319 (1835) for this true rule, as did
Sanborn, J., dissenting in the Decker case, supra note 225.
230. It is clear enough that the Court meant by this conclusion that there was
no evidence that either party sought by any undue means to influence the appraisers,
or either of them, in the choice of an umpire.
231. Accord:
Ind. Vernon Ins. Co. v. Maitlin, 158 Ind. 393, 63 N.E. 755 (1902). The appraisal
provision contained no clause that appraisal be upon the request, or written request,
of either party. The Court concluded from the evidence that: "The appraisers seem
to have been equally unreasonable in their views concerning the proper qualifications
of an umpire. Those views proved to be irreconcilable. It cannot be said that one
of the parties [appraisers?] more than the other, was responsible for the failure to
agree upon an umpire. We cannot attribute bad faith or perversity to either. We must
ascribe their failure to agree, rather, to the peculiarities of the two appraisers. Other
appraisers, if chosen, may easily decide the amount of loss, or, in case of a difference
of opinion on this point, may promptly select an umpire."
The bone-of-contention between the appraisers in this case was whether the person
to be chosen as umpire should be a local or a non-local person. Courts in other
jurisdictions have ruled that action of the insurer's appointee in insisting upon a non-local
person, like in this case, is arbitrary and unreasonable and that action of insured's
appointee in insisting upon a local person, like in this case, is reasonable. Accordingly
they have ruled, quite as a matter of law, that the insured can maintain his action.
Iowa. Westenhaver v. Cerman-American Ins. Co., 113 Iowa 726, 82 N.W. 717 (1900).
Whether or not the appraisal provision was conditional upon a request, or written
request, of either party, does not appear in the report of the case.
The case is most remarkable for its judicial gloss of the insured's iniquities in
connection with the appraisal. Apparently the Court so indulged the insured in order
to derive, notwithstanding the failure, "an honest and earnest attempt" of the appraisers
to agree upon an umpire and thereby recognize the insured as free from fault and
thereby qualify the insured to claim a second attempt. laving so exculpated the insured
the Court recited what it considered to he the established rule, namely, that "it was
plaintiff's duty, when the appraisers first selected failed to agree through no fault of
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Vhen the first appraisal ends in an award, but is held invalid. A majority
of the decisions covering the situation wherein the appraisal goes to an
award but is held invalid are in accord with the foregoing majority view
covering the situation wherein the appraisal fails before award. If the
appraisal and award fall without fault of the insured lie can, by the
majority view, maintain his action to collect on the policy without further
regard for the appraisal provision. Thus, the New York Court of Appeals,
in holding invalid an appraisal and award because the appraisers refused
to consider certain matters of evidence relating to the valuation of the
property and loss, ruled out the requirement of any resubmission as follows:
"However, after an appraisal proceeding was terminated and the award
has been set aside, without any fault of the insured, he need not submit
to any further appraisement but may sue on the policy. 232
either of the parties, to select a new appraiser, in order that the amount of their recovery
should be fixed." (Italics supplied).
It seems clear from the Court's report of the case that the insured selected a
person as appraiser who would serve the insured and do his bidding throughout the
appraisal. That appraiser's nominations for umpire were obviously designed to gain an
umpire who would go along with him on any difference accruing between the two
appraisers; he proved to be the puppet of the insured during the negotiations over the
umpire and lent himself to the insured's ex parte dictation as to whom he should agree
upon as umpire. Concerning these facts the Court uttered the following extraordinary
conclusion: "These facts are mentioned not for the Purpose of showing fraud or bad
faith, but as evincing a purpose on the part of plaintiffs to derive every advantage
possible in the arbitration." (Italics supplied).
The two appraisers, according to the Court, after spending "some days in an
effort to agree, mutually came to the conclusion that they could not agree, and so
informed the parties." The insurer thereupon selected a new appraiser and demanded
that the insured select another and proceed with the appraisement. The insured refused
and immediately brought his action. Compare Caledonian Ins. Co. v. Traub, 83 Md.
524, 35 AtI. 13 (1896).
Quite clearly a comparable course of conduct on the part of the insurer and/or,
its appointee, would have worked the loss of its rights under the provision. See Read
v. State Ins. Co., 103 Iowa 307, 72 N.W. 665 (1897).
232. Ethel Cervant v. New England Fire Ins. Co., 306 N.Y. 391, 118 N.E.2d
574 (1954).
Accord:
U.S. Aetna Ins. Co. v. lIefferlin, 260 Fed. 695 (9th Cir. 1919), (award invalid becamse
appraisers overlooked items of property which should have been apraised).
Ky. Globe & Rutgers Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 127 S.W. 765 (Ky. 1910) (award invalid
because appraisers did not separately find and state sound value and damage.)
Md. Ilome Ins. Co. v. Shiff's Sois, 103 Md. 648, 64 AtI. 63 (1906) (majority award
by insurer's appraiser and uipire ruled invalid tnder the particular submission).
Mo. Security Printing Co. v. Connecticut Fire Ins. Co., 209 Mo. App. 422, 240 S.W.
263 (1922) (award invalid because appraisers did not separately find and note in sufficient
detail sound value and damage). Compare, Cribel v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 28 S.W.2d
411 (Mo. 1930).
N.D. Siegal v. Insurance Co., 56 N.D. 841, 219 N.W. 467 (1928). (majority award
by insured's appraiser and umpire ruled invalid for the two had not actually agreed
either upon amount of inventory or the amount of loss and damage).
Tenn. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 129 Tern. 55, 164 S.W. 1186
(1914)(bill in equity by insurer to vacate award; cross bill to enforce award or collect
on policies. Award vacated apparently because of no separate statement of sound value
and damage and judgment for insured for amount of loss on insured's cross hill.)
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It is apparent that the instances of potential "fault" of the insured,
or of the insurer, in this situation and for the purpose at hand are likely
to be different from those attending a failure of the appraisal before award.
Thcy are likely to involve the misconduct of the party either in clandestinely
appointing a partisan appraiser who serves the purpose, or in inducing, or
contributing to, such misconduct within the appraisal board as constitutes
sufficient cause to set aside the award. Rarely has the insured been ad-
judged at fault in these cases.
233
The minority view, as voiced in the foregoing cases ruling the survival
of the appraisal provision when the appraisal fails before award, undergocs
a dcegrce of refincment into technicality in some of the cases passing upon
the situation now under consideration. That refinement or limitation upon
the general minority view leaves the rule about as follows: The insured is
bound to a resubimission when the appraisal and award arc held invalid, if,
but only if, the insurer disowns the award when the insured objects thereto.
Otherwise stated, if the insurer defends the award, rather than disclaiming
it in deference to the insured's claim of invalidity, and it is ruled invalid,
no resubmission need be offered or undertaken by the insured.
Cases interposing this requirement upon the insurer to qualify its
claim to another appraisal after the award is ruled invalid stem from the
Minnesota case of Levine v. Lancashire Ins. Co.2 3' decided in 1896. The
insured sued to vacate the award and collect on the policy. The award
was set aside for partisanship on the part of the appraiser appointed by
the insurer and his domination of an inept umpire. The insurcd's appointee
did not join ini the award. The nisdoings of the insurer's appointee were
not charged to the insurer so as to make them a "fault" on its part.
In denying the claim to resubmission by the insurer, the Court first
observed generally upon the survival of the appraisal provision as follows:
...l-he law also, undoubtedly, is that under such a provision if an award
is set aside for misconduct of the arbitrators, not participated in or caused
by the insurer, the agreement for an appraisement still remains in force,
and a new appraiseme nt, unless it had become impossible, would still be a
condition precedent to a right of action on the policy unless waived."
(italics supplied.)
The Court then turned to the making of waiver against the insurer
for defending, and not disclaiming, the award. It continued that, even
though the award failed without fault of the insurer, "yet its conduct after
233. It did happen in Reilley v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 311 Ill. App. 562, 37 N.E.Z2d
352 (1941).
234. 66 Minn. 138, 68 NW. 855 (1896.).. To like effect, DIufresne v. Marine
Ins. Co., 157 Minn.N0, 196'N.W,. 560. (1923)(policy..coveriug.theft.oLfaut6iobile).
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plaintiffs rejected the award clearly constituted a waiver of the right to a
new appraisement. Not only did it never ask for or even suggest a new
appraisement, but in its communications with plaintiffs it expressly insisted
on the award already made, and notified them that any claim under the
policy must he made on that basis, and no other. It took the same position
in its answer." 2 "4
In short, the insurer must choose either to stand on the award and try
to sustain it against the insured's attack, or to disclaim it in deference to
the insured's challenge and claim, if it desires one, a resubmission. Its
claim to resubmission is made thus conditional; the insured's obligation to
resubmit is thus qualified.
In a subsequent case2,85 the Court vouched for the Levine case as laying
down a sound principle and elaborated upon its being applicable alike to
insurer and to insured. By this principle, "if an award is attacked upon
the ground of fraud or misconduct of the referees, and one party to the
controversy notifies the other of that fact, demanding a reappraiscneut on
account of such misconduct, it then becomes the duty of the other party
to investigate the validity of the charges, and determine whether or not
it will abide by the award or submit to a reappraisement; and, if it shall
detennine to abide by the award and refuse to submit to a reappraisement,
such party is thereby estopped from thereafter demanding another appraise-
ment, in case the charges shall prove to be sustained. The purpose of
the provisions in the standard policy with reference to arbitration is to
secure a speedy determination of the controversy, and to hold that the
party insisting upon the validity of an award might litigate that question,
and not be bound by the result of the action, would be to create an inter-
minable method by which the controversy could be submitted again and
again."
The Court also made explicit denial that the foregoing principle was
partial to the insured; it declared that "the conclusion we have arrived
at does not result in a discrimination against the insurance companies, for
the same principle would apply to the actions of the insured in ease the
234a. Levine v. Lancashire Ins. Co., 66 Minn. 138, 149, 68 N.V. 855, 860 (1896).
235. Christianson v. Norwich Union Fire Ils. Co., 84 Minn. 526, 88 N.. 16
(1901)(In its answer to the insured's action to set aside the award and collect on
the policy, the insurer defended the award, but it also pleaded in its answer that if the
award should be held invalid, then there should he a resubtuission).
In accord with the foregoing Minnesota decisions are the following:
Mass. See Second Society of Universalists v. Royal Ins. Co., 221 Mass. 518, 109 N.E.
384 (1915).
Mo. Coffin v. German Fire Ins.. Co., 142 Mo. App. 295, 126 S.W. 253 (1910).
Okla. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Jester, 37 Okla. 413, 132 Pac. 130 (1913)
Texas. American Ins. Co. v. Bell, 33 Tex Civ. App. 11, 75 S.. 319 (1903); Security
Ins. Co. v. Kelly, 196 S.W. 874 (Tex. Cit. App. 1917).
Wash. See Davis v. Atlas Assur, Co., 16 Wash. 232, 47 Pac. 436 (1896).
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insurer should attack the award for the same purpose." It is difficult to
verify the principle in this light.
236
There is some authority sustaining the minority view with respect to
the question at hand which does not interpose the technicality that the
insurer disclaim the award as required in the Levine case. Thus, in Fisher
v .Merchants Ins. Co.,237 the Supreme Court of Maine took the general
position that an ineffectual attempt to comply with the appraisal provision
is not a compliance therewith, and the insured must make a second attempt.
The insured sued to collect on the policy, and in his amended complaint
set forth an appraisal and an award therein which lie claimed was invalid
for misconduct of the referees making it. Insurer requested an instruction
to the jury that if the failure of the award was without fault of the insurer,
the insured was required to take steps to have a new reference and in
absence of evidence that he did so, the action could not be maintained.
It ruled that the insurer was entitled to the instruction as requested. Said
the Court:
"The action in such a case is upon the policy, but the damages
recoverable are such as have been previously ascertained and determined
by the arbitrators, unless the plaintiff shows some sufficient reason why
such a determination could not have been obtained. Consequently there
can be no action until performance of the condition or excuse shown for
nonperformance. And it is not sufficient to show an award which the
plaintiff repudiates and is not willing to be bound by."
"The action can only be maintained to recover the amount determined
upon by the arbitrators, or, if their determination and award were invalid,
then the plaintiff must allege and prove, either that the amount of the
plaintiff's loss has been determined by other arbitrators chosen in the
manner stipulated by the parties, or some sufficient reason why such a
determination has become unnecessary or impossible." (Italics supplied) 236
It may be pointed out that these cases dealing with the claim to
resubmission after failure of the appraisal and award have also involved a
236. If the insurer challenges the award (either by an action to set it aside, or in
defense to an action by the insured to enforce it) and the insurer prevails over the
insured's defense of it, it seems very difficult to believe that the principle is to be
honored as against the insured. lhis is true because it is doubted that the insured
will or should be held disqualified to offer resubmission and thereby be disabled from
maintaining any action to collect on the policy. To honor the principle as against
the insured would, it seems, work his loss of all claim on the policy, whereas, to honor
it as against the insurer works its loss only of its claim to insured's offer of resubmission
when it (the insurer) fails in its support of the award.
237. 95 Me. 486, 50 Atl. 282 (1901).
Accord, see Headley v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 17 La. App. 25, 134 So.305 1931.
also238. &,rady v. Fire & Marine Ins. Co,, 27 R.I. 435, 63 Atl. 173 (1906). See
also Riddell v. Rochester Cerman Ins. Co., 36 R.I. 240, 89 A. 83 (1914); Early v.Providence Wash. Ins. Co., 31 R.I. 225, 76 Atl, 753 (1910).
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question of civil procedure which does not arise when the appraisal falls
before award. The insured seeks to get rid of the award and to collect
on the policy. Can this be done in a single action? The near consensus
of the decisions is that the two objectives may be accomplished in one
action. Thus, in the foregoing Levine case the insured set forth in the
complaint that an appraisal had been had and award rendered but that
the award should be set aside because of the misconduct of the insurer's
appointee as appraiser and of the umpire who had rendered the award. The
Court identified the action as one "to set aside the award and to recover
on the policy." Said the Court further: "There can be no doubt but that
all this relief may be granted in the same action." It is in connection with
the second part of the action that the survival of the appraisal provision
is tested.231a
239. See further, St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 129 Tenn. 55,
164 S.W. 1186 (1914)(insurer sued to vacate award; insured filed cross-bill in alternative
to enforce award, or, if award invalid, to collect on policy. Insurer successful on its
bill; insured allowed to collect on cross bill); Vincent v. German Ins. Co., 120 Iowa
272, 94 N.V. 458 (1903); Davis v. Atlas Assur. Co., 16 Wash. 232, 47 Pac.. 436 (1896).
Compare Early v. Providence Washington Ins. Co., supra note 238 (Insured cannot,
4% action "at law" to collect on policy, impeach the award because of alleged misconduct
of appraisers by excluding certain items of property from their computation of the loss
and incompetency of the appraisal board). See contra that the "action at law" is not
misconceived in such cases, Second Society of Universalists v. Royal Ins. Co., 221 Mass.
518, 109 N.E. 384 (1915); also Sullivan v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 169 NY. 213,
63 N.E. 146 (1901 ); Wilbisky v. German Alliance Ins. Co., 90 Misc. 335, 152 N.Y.S.
1048 (1st Dep't 1915).
